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 Abstract 
After the recent crisis, a reduction was observed in global current account (“flow”) imbalances. 
Even so, global disequilibria as measured in terms of countries’ net foreign assets (“stock 
imbalances”) kept increasing. This paper discusses whether stock imbalances have a 
stabilising or destabilising impact on countries’ accumulation of external wealth. That is, do 
creditor economies, by virtue of their positive stock of net foreign assets, keep accumulating  
–everything else equal— external wealth? Do debtor countries, due to their negative net foreign 
assets position, keep accumulating external debt? Our results show that in debtor economies 
the existing stock of net debt helps to limit current account deficits, thus halting future debt 
accumulation. In creditor countries, however, the positive stock of net foreign assets 
contributes –everything else equal— to increase future current account surpluses, potentially 
leading to destabilising dynamics in wealth accumulation. This asymmetry between creditors 
and debtors holds in spite of the stabilising impact that net foreign assets have on the trade 
balance of creditor countries through real exchange rate fluctuations, and might have major 
implications for global trade and growth. 
Keywords: global imbalances, current account, international investment position, external 
debt, growth. 
JEL Classification: F1, F32. 
 
 
  
 Resumen 
Después de la crisis reciente, se ha observado una reducción en los desequilibrios globales de los 
saldos por cuenta corriente («desequilibrios en términos de flujo»). Sin embargo, los desequilibrios 
globales medidos en términos de los activos externos netos de los países («desequilibrios en 
términos de stock») siguieron aumentando. Este documento estudia si los desequilibrios de stock 
tienen un impacto estabilizador o desestabilizador en la acumulación de riqueza externa de los 
países. Es decir, ¿las economías acreedoras, en virtud de sus tenencias de activos externos, 
siguen acumulando riqueza?, ¿los países deudores, debido a su posición de inversión neta 
negativa, siguen acumulando deuda externa? Nuestros resultados muestran que en las 
economías deudoras el stock existente de deuda neta ayuda a contener los déficits de cuenta 
corriente, limitando así la acumulación futura de deuda. Sin embargo, en los países acreedores 
el stock positivo de activos externos netos contribuye a aumentar los superávits futuros del saldo 
por cuenta corriente, lo que puede llevar a dinámicas desestabilizadoras en la acumulación de 
riqueza. Esta asimetría entre acreedores y deudores se mantiene a pesar del impacto 
estabilizador que los activos exteriores netos tienen sobre la balanza comercial de los países 
acreedores a través de las fluctuaciones del tipo de cambio real, y podría tener implicaciones 
relevantes para el comercio y el crecimiento global. 
Palabras clave: desequilibrios globales, cuenta corriente, posición de inversión internacional, 
deuda externa, crecimiento. 
Códigos JEL: F1, F32. 
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1 Introduction 
Prior to the Great Recession, the widening of global imbalances was perceived as one of the 
main risks to the global economy. While perhaps of a secondary order of importance in triggering 
the financial crisis, global imbalances constituted a symptom of an unsustainable pattern of 
global growth (Blanchard and Milesi-Ferretti [2009]) and a source of ample global liquidity and 
loose financial conditions that were feeding the crisis to come.  
Some nine years after the outburst of the crisis, where do we stand? Has the increasing 
trend in global imbalances been corrected? The answer depends on how we measure them. 
Global imbalances have been traditionally characterized as divergences in the current 
account flows of surplus and deficit countries, that is, “current account” or “flow imbalances”. 
When the global financial crisis exploded, an important correction in flow imbalances was 
observed, an adjustment that continued also when the activity begun to increase back (see left 
panel of Figure 1). That was generally interpreted as a sign of the sustainability of the recovery. 
Still, global imbalances can also be characterized from a stock, rather than a flow 
perspective, based on the net foreign assets (NFA) position of creditor and debtor countries 
(“stock” imbalances). Under this metric, the right panel of Figure 1 shows that the slight correction 
in imbalances observed after the crisis was only a transitory phenomenon, as afterwards stock 
imbalances continued widening, at least, until 2014. 
Figure 1. Global imbalances from a flow and a stock perspective: 2000-2015 
A. Current Account 
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B. Net Foreign Assets 
 
In light of this evidence, the focus of the economic debate both in academia and policy 
institutions has been broadened from analyzing current account imbalances to carry out a closer 
inspection of the implications that stock imbalances may have for external stability. Among policy 
institutions, the IMF, in its 2014 World Economic Outlook (IMF [2014a]), alerts against the 
projected widening of stock imbalances in the next years, which may leave several debtor 
economies exposed to market sentiments. In its External Sector Reports (IMF [2014b], IMF 
[2016]) the IMF also suggests the opportunity to monitor and ultimately limit the growth of stock 
imbalances of both debtor and creditor countries. Several academic contributions have also 
recently reconsidered the link between stock imbalances and financial stability.  Forbes et al. 
(2016) focused on the implications that large net foreign assets positions and their composition 
may have for the ability of an economy to respond to external shocks. Benetrix et al. (2015) 
showed how the currency composition of countries’ net foreign assets leads them to accumulate 
or lose wealth through valuation effects due to exchange rate fluctuations. 
The aim of this paper is to contribute to the debate on the implications of stock 
imbalances for external stability. The link between net external debt and the probability of financial 
crisis has been addressed by Catao and Milesi-Ferretti (2014). They note that high levels of net 
external debt increase the probability of crisis and that after the crisis there is a reversion of 
current account imbalances. 
Our contribution is more general, and consists in exploring the impact of net stock 
positions on the accumulation of external wealth by answering two related sets of questions.  
First, do stock imbalances have a stabilizing or destabilizing impact on the accumulation 
of external wealth? That is, do creditor countries, by virtue of their positive stock of net foreign 
assets, keep accumulating– everything else equal— external wealth? Do debtor countries, due 
precisely to their stock of external debt, keep increasing their net foreign debt over time? If this 
were the case, stock imbalances would lead creditor (debtors) to accumulate (lose) even more 
wealth in the future, and may therefore contribute to triggering destabilizing dynamics in the 
evolution of external wealth, in particular in debtor countries where the potential unsustainability 
of external positions is more evident. 
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It is important to note that the analysis only considers the impact of net foreign assets 
on the current account. Although the current account is the main driver of wealth accumulation, 
also valuation effects can affect the dynamics of external wealth, with a substantial impact. These 
effect are left aside in this paper for reasons of space, but also because, as described below, 
they tend to be quite erratic, anticipating a less clear relationship with past debt accumulation. 
According to economic theory, the impact of the net external position on the current 
account may come through two direct channels. First, creditors, whose portfolio contains more 
external assets than liabilities, might receive more revenues from their foreign assets than they 
pay on their cross-border liabilities. Positive investment income flows would lead them to run –
everything else equal—current account surpluses, and to accumulate even more external wealth 
over time. The opposite might happen for debtor economies, which are likely to end up paying 
more revenues on their foreign liabilities than they get on their external assets, thus running into 
current account deficits and incurring in further wealth losses.  
A second channel through which creditor (debtor) positions may lead to future wealth 
accumulation (losses) is countries’ response to cyclical positive income shocks. In this respect, 
it has been observed that a cyclical temporary increase in a country’s wealth lead debtor 
economies to run higher deficits than creditor countries. The literature has identified two 
mechanisms. Kraay and Ventura (2000) point out that if agents decide to invest the additional 
income resulting from the shock according to the portfolio they already have –skewed towards 
foreign assets in the case of creditors and towards domestic ones in the case of debtors— 
debtor economies would incur in higher current account deficits than creditors. Bussiere et al. 
(2003) observed that if debtor countries were more credit constrained than creditor ones, they 
would decide to borrow more from abroad once a positive income shock partially releases their 
constraints, thus generating larger current account deficits.     
On the other hand, economic theory also supports the hypothesis that the stock of net 
foreign assets might have a stabilizing impact on the accumulation of external wealth. Wealth 
effects should imply that wealthier, creditor countries will end up consuming and therefore 
importing more than poorer, debtor economies, thus reducing their trade surpluses and current 
account balances.  
Whether stock imbalances have a stabilizing or destabilizing impact on wealth 
accumulation is therefore essentially an empirical question, which we seek to address in  
this paper.  
A second, related question concerns price fluctuations due to stock imbalances. 
Namely, are there automatic adjustment mechanisms working through relative price adjustments 
that can reduce the accumulation or loss of external wealth over time? The indirect impact of 
stock imbalances on wealth accumulation through exchange rate fluctuations is based on the 
prediction that wealthier, creditor countries should record, at least in the long run, an appreciation 
of their exchange rate (Dornbusch and Fischer [1980], Lane and Milesi-Ferretti [2004]). The 
exchange rate appreciation, in turn, might impact wealth accumulation in several ways. First, it 
would reduce the competitiveness of creditors’ products, thus implying a shrinking in their trade 
and current account surplus, with an indirect stabilizing effect on the accumulation of external 
wealth. Second, it will likely affect the net revenues received through the income balance from 
the stock of external assets and liabilities, the overall impact depending on the currency 
composition of a country’s external wealth. Finally, exchange rate fluctuations can cause 
valuation changes through capital gains or losses on existing gross positions, which may either 
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amplify or reduce a country’s wealth accumulation depending on the currency composition of its 
portfolio.  
The second issue we address in this paper concerns precisely the importance of these 
adjustment mechanisms. Are they empirically relevant? Are they somewhat hampered in a 
context in which exchange rates might not freely respond to changes in a country’s net foreign 
asset position, like, for instance, a common currency area?   
We address these questions empirically using Balance of Payments data from 1980 to 
2015 for a set of 39 advanced and emerging market economies. As a first step, we inspect the 
evolution of the wealth accumulation of these countries over the last three decades by 
decomposing it into its main channels (trade balance and investment income balance, for the 
current account, and valuation effects), trying to extract some stylized facts. Then we analyze, 
through panel regressions of the current account and their sub-balances, the links between stock 
positions (net foreign assets) and the evolution of external flows, considering also other 
determinants of the current account, in the spirit of IMF (2013). We also check if the results 
depend on the country’s level of income, by estimating separate regressions for advanced and 
emerging economies.   
The results of this analysis unveil a remarkable asymmetry regarding the impact of net 
foreign assets on wealth accumulation: it is only for creditor countries that stock imbalances lead 
to destabilizing dynamics. In debtor economies, instead, the existing stock of net debt tends to 
limit current account deficits and to contain future debt accumulation, with a stabilizing impact. 
Specifically, debtor countries tend to pay more revenues on their stock of debt, but also consume 
and import less due to a negative wealth effect, which halts to some extent the accumulation of 
external debt over time. Creditor countries, instead, due to their positive stock of net foreign assets, 
have a tendency to run current account surpluses and to keep accumulating external wealth. This 
seems to be related to a weak wealth effect on imports for these economies. That is, either the 
marginal propensity to consume or invest out of external wealth of creditor countries is small, or 
there are other characteristics that do not make their imports react much to  increased wealth 
(for instance, a high propensity to consume domestically-produced goods), and cannot 
compensate for the increased investment income they receive on their net foreign asset position.  
As for the indirect impact through relative prices, the data suggest that the higher the 
stock of external wealth of creditor countries the more appreciated their exchange rate, which, 
in turn, should limit the size of their trade surpluses and the accumulation of further wealth. 
Therefore stock imbalances might have an indirect stabilizing impact on the trade balance 
through the real exchange rate, but only, as our results show, for creditor countries. Yet this 
stabilizing relationship, which seems to have been reduced for those economies that joined the 
Euro Area, is not sufficient to limit creditors’ wealth accumulation.  
It should be clear from the onset that the purpose of this paper is purely positive. 
Namely, we aim at studying the impact of stock imbalances on wealth accumulation, taking also 
into account their indirect impact through price fluctuations. Finding that stock imbalances lead 
to destabilizing dynamics in wealth accumulation –as our results seem to suggest for creditor 
countries—, would imply that any desired adjustment in flow imbalances should take this 
mechanism into account. Moreover, given that stock imbalances are projected to keep rising in 
the next years, their pattern will likely have implications for the future evolution of flow imbalances 
as well. However, we do not try to extract any normative conclusion from our results, neither as 
for the desirable size of stock imbalances nor for wealth accumulation. 
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Section 2 presents some stylized facts on the channels through which countries 
accumulate external wealth. Section 3 details the theoretical predictions of the literature 
regarding the impact that the stock of net foreign assets should have on wealth accumulation 
through each channel. In section 4 we test the empirical relevance of these effects, by estimating 
the impact that the stock of net foreign assets has on the current account and its sub-balances. 
Section 5 highlights the heterogeneity between advanced and emerging market economies. The 
sixth section focuses on the indirect impact that net foreign assets may have on the current 
account balance through the real exchange rate. We draw some conclusions in section 7.  
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2 The accumulation of external wealth: main channels and stylized facts 
2.1 The main channels of wealth accumulation 
In order to analyze the channels through which countries accumulate external wealth, we adopt 
a frequently used decomposition of the evolution of net foreign assets over time.1 Net foreign 
assets (NFA) are calculated by subtracting domestic assets owned by foreigners (L) from the 
value of foreign assets held by nationals (A): 
ܰܨܣ௜௧ = ܣ௜௧ − ܮ௜௧. 
Changes in net foreign assets over time result from the financial operations with the rest 
of the world that are the financial counterpart of the current and capital account balance (CA), 
from valuation changes due to capital gains (VAL), and errors and omissions (EO), as sometimes 
there exist small discrepancies among the different statistical sources:    
ܰܨܣ௜௧ − ܰܨܣ௜௧ିଵ = ܥܣ௜௧ + ܸܣܮ௜௧ + ܧ ௜ܱ௧.          [1] 
Dividing [1] by nominal GDP gives: 
݂݊ܽ௜௧ − ݂݊ܽ௜௧ିଵ = − ௚೔೟ଵା௚೔೟ ݂݊ܽ௜௧ିଵ + ܿܽ௜௧ + ݒ݈ܽ௜௧ + ݁݋௜௧,           [2] 
where lower case letters denote the ratio of the corresponding variable to GDP and g is nominal 
GDP growth. The first term in equation [2] captures the equilibrating effect that GDP growth has 
over existing stock positions.2 Capital gains are calculated as the difference between changes in 
the stock of foreign assets (liabilities) and net financial outflows (inflows). 
The current and capital account balance, in turn, can be decomposed into three 
different sub-balances. First, the trade balance (TB) corresponds to the revenues from exports 
minus the import expenses on both goods and services. Second, the investment income balance 
(IIB) results from the revenues from foreign assets owned by nationals minus the payments on 
domestic assets owned by foreigners. Finally, the residual balance (RES) includes the primary 
income balance except investment income, the secondary income balance, and the capital 
account balance. Expressed in terms of GDP: 
ܿܽ௜௧ = ݐܾ௜௧ + ܾ݅݅௜௧ + ݎ݁ݏ௜௧.   [3] 
2.2 Some stylized facts on wealth accumulation 
In what follows we present the results of applying decompositions [2] and [3] to a broad sample 
of advanced and emerging countries using Balance of Payments data between 1980 and 2015, 
grouping the economies in our sample depending on their level of income and on their net 
external position.3 Some stylized facts on external positions and wealth accumulation emerge.  
                                                                          
1  See, for example, Habib (2010). 
2  For example, when nominal GDP grows and NFA are positive (negative) the first term in [2] is negative (positive), which 
tends to reduce the net creditor (debtor) position of the country as a percentage of GDP. Declines in nominal GDP have 
the opposite effect, i.e. they amplify the net debtor or creditor position of a country.  
3  Country sample and data sources are detailed in Appendix 1. The results of decompositions [2] and [3] are reported also 
in Tables 2.1 and 2.2 in Appendix 2. Countries switch from the debtor to the creditor category and vice versa when their 
net external position changes.  
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Increasing pace of wealth accumulation (loss) for advanced creditors (debtors) in 
the last two decades (see Figure 2). Advanced creditor economies have accumulated external 
wealth at a rising pace since 1995. Similarly, advanced debtor countries have steadily increased 
their stock of net external debt since 1990, with the exception of one period of rebalancing in the 
early 2000s. These trends are less clear in the case of emerging countries, with emerging debtors 
increasing their external liabilities over the full horizon but reversing this trend significantly in the 
last 5 years.     
The current and capital account (ca) is the dominating driver of external wealth 
dynamics. Among the channels through which countries accumulate or lose net foreign assets 
over time, the strongest, from a quantitative point of view, seems to be the current and capital 
account (green bars in Figure 2). CA developments are particularly relevant for advanced 
creditors. Their importance for the wealth accumulation of these countries has strongly and 
steadily increased over the last two decades.     
Sizable but volatile capital gains (val). Valuation changes from capital gains and 
losses on existing stock positions (violet bars) have been of a considerable magnitude in several 
periods and, for debtor economies, over the whole time horizon. Still, they tend to exhibit a 
considerable volatility.  
Figure 2. Decomposition of NFA changes, eq. [2]. Non-weighted averages. 
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Moving to the components of the current and capital account identified in equation [3] 
and displayed in Figure 3, the following traits can be highlighted: 
The trade balance (tb) is relatively volatile and especially relevant for creditor 
countries. Over the whole time horizon the bulk of CA flows of both advanced and emerging 
economies was due to the trade balance. In particular, in the case of advanced creditor countries 
the relevance of trade surpluses for CA dynamics has been growing steadily since the early 
nineties. Compared to other CA components, the trade balance shows a rather volatile pattern 
but tends to be more persistent for creditor economies. 
The investment income balance (iib) is more persistent and quantitatively relevant 
especially for debtors. Compared to the trade balance, the iib exhibits a higher persistency. It 
was responsible for the majority of the CA deficits of both advanced and emerging debtor 
countries over the full time horizon. Still, its relevance has been growing for advanced creditors 
since the early 2000s, and in the last 10 years the net investment income they received from 
abroad has contributed significantly to their CA surpluses.  
The investment income balance has the expected sign:  positive for creditors 
negative for debtors, with the remarkable exception of EME debtors, for which returns 
and portfolio composition matter. Unsurprisingly countries’ net external investment position 
tends to determine whether they receive net income from abroad. Still, the case of emerging 
creditors –whose iib is negative in all the periods considered— highlights that there can be 
exceptions to this pattern. Indeed, despite their positive NFA position, their portfolio composition, 
skewed towards safe low-return assets and risky high-return liabilities, implies that they end up 
paying more on external liabilities than they receive on their assets.4 Wealth accumulation through 
                                                                          
4  Tables 2.3 and 2.4 in Appendix 2 show a detailed analysis of countries’ portfolio composition. 
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the iib –its direction and magnitude—depends not only on a country’s NFA position but also on 
its portfolio composition and on returns on assets and liabilities.   
Figure 3. Decomposition of cumulated current and capital account, eq. [3].  
Non-weighted averages. 
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Highly persistent creditor and debtor positions. Creditor and debtor positions are highly 
persistent. As it can be seen in Figure 4, in our sample the conditional probability of a country to 
remain a debtor is 98% and the probability of remaining creditor is 92%. 5 
Figure 4a. Conditional probability of remaining debtor / creditor 
 
Figure 4b. Probability of CA worsening (improvement) for debtors (creditors)  
conditional on last period worsening (improvement) 
 
Figure 5. Current account and NFA. Difference between debtors and creditors 
 
                                                                          
5  This implies that using the net external position as a grouping criterion is quite robust to changes in the reference year 
considered. 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 17 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1742 
Surpluses are more persistent for creditors than deficits for debtors. The second 
panel in Figure 4 suggests that the probability of widening surpluses is higher for creditors than 
widening the deficit for debtors. Complementarily, Figure 5 shows that both creditor countries 
and debtor economies can post CA surpluses or deficits, but the bias towards surpluses is much 
more marked for creditors than the bias towards deficits for debtors. Indeed, the fitting line in the 
scatterplot for creditors is quite steeper than for debtors –and the difference between the slopes 
is statistically significant–. This asymmetry, which was also evident in previous graphs (trade 
balance rather persistent in creditors and much less in debtors), will turn out to be key in our 
empirical analysis. 
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3 The impact of stock positions on wealth accumulation: what theory suggests 
Having had a look at the channels through which countries, from an accounting perspective, 
accumulate or lose external wealth, we illustrate here how stock imbalances, in the form of net foreign 
assets, can affect the evolution of external wealth through each channel, either directly or indirectly. 
Figure 6 summarises the channels through which the stock of net foreign assets can affect wealth 
accumulation. The red lines reflect the direct impact of the NFA position on wealth accumulation 
through the current account. The green lines convey their indirect impact through the exchange rate 
channel (where REER refers to the real effective exchange rate). The signs in the boxes denote the 
expected effect of NFA on external flows, according to economic theory. We detail all these effects 
in what follows, with the numbers in parenthesis identifying the different channels.6 
Figure 6. The dynamics of external wealth accumulation 
 
3.1 Direct impact of stock imbalances on the CA 
(1) Through the investment income balance: The investment income balance, resulting from 
the difference between revenues (R) and payments (P) on the existing stock of assets and 
liabilities, can be written as: 
ܫܫܤ௜௧ = ܴ௜௧ − ௜ܲ௧ = 	 ݅௜௧஺ܣ௜௧ିଵ −	 ݅௜௧௅ ܮ௜௧ିଵ	,	                           [4] 
where ݅௧஺ and ݅௧௅ are the implicit yields on assets and liabilities. Dividing [4] by nominal GDP gives: 
ܾ݅݅௜௧ =
݅௜௧஺
1 + ௜݃௧ ∙ ݂݊ܽ௜௧ିଵ + ቆ
݅௜௧஺ − ݅௜௧௅
1 + ௜݃௧ቇ ∙ ݈௜௧ିଵ	.	 
                                                                          
6  The dotted lines and boxes indicate that these channels will not be addressed in the empirical analysis. 
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Assume that a share ߱௜௝஺  (߱௜௝௅ ) of country i’s assets (liabilities) is denominated in country 
j’s currency. Then the IIB as a share of GDP can be expressed as: 
ܾ݅݅௜௧ = ൤ పഢ೟
ಲ෢
ଵା௚೔೟
(∆ܨܺܧܴ௜௧஺)ିଵ൨ ∙ ݂݊ܽ௜௧ିଵ + ൤పഢ೟
ಲ෢/∆ி௑ாோ೔೟ಲିపഢ೟ಽ෢/∆ி௑ாோ೔೟ಽ
ଵା௚೔೟
൨ ∙ ݈௜௧ିଵ	,		           [5]   
where ∆ܨܺܧܴ௧஺ = ி௑ாோ೟
ಲ
ி௑ாோ೟షభಲ
 (∆ܨܺܧܴ௧௅)	 is the appreciation of the financial effective exchange rate 
from the asset (liability) point of view, defined as the weighted average of nominal bilateral 
exchange rates with weights ߱௜௝஺  (߱௜௝௅ )	 reflecting the currency denomination country i’s assets 
(liabilities). Capped variables denote returns excluding exchange rate effects.7 
Equation [5] shows that the investment income balance depends positively on the net 
foreign asset position, as creditor countries tend to receive more revenues from their stock of 
foreign assets than they pay on their liabilities. The direct impact of stock imbalances on the 
investment income balance is then expected to be positive:  
ܾ݅݅௜௧ = ݂(݂݊ܽ௜௧ିଵᇣᇧᇤᇧᇥ)
ା
. 
More precisely, stock imbalances are expected to exert a destabilizing impact on 
external flows through the IIB, that is, creditor countries will tend to receive investment income 
from abroad thereby increasing further –everything else equal— their net foreign asset position.  
It is important to notice that the exact relationship between net foreign assets and 
investment income depends on returns on assets and liabilities, on growth and on nominal 
exchange rate fluctuations, as [5] shows. As assets and liabilities include both equity and debt 
and their implicit yields are very different, the composition of a country’s portfolio is also likely to 
be relevant.8 Moreover, the positive association between net foreign assets and the investment 
income balance could be either mitigated or magnified by the spread between the returns on 
assets and liabilities, especially in the presence of large gross positions.9   
(2) Through the trade balance via wealth effects: Another channel through which 
stock positions can directly affect the CA is the trade balance. The standard argument in the 
literature to illustrate this link is the presence of wealth effects, which rely on the notion that 
domestic absorption should depend positively on the stock of financial wealth, which, in turn, 
tends to increase with the value of net foreign assets. For the purpose of illustration, assuming 
quadratic utility and a representative agent, we can write: 
௜ܲ௧ܥ௜௧ = (1 − ߮)ሼ݅௜௧ ௜ܹ௧ିଵ + ܪ௜௧ሽ = (1 − ߮)ሼ݅௜௧ܰܨܣ௜௧ିଵ + ݅௜௧ ௜ܸ௧ିଵ + ܪ௜௧ሽ,        [6] 
where ௜ܲ௧ܥ௜௧ is nominal consumption expenditure, ߮ households’ discount factor, ௜ܹ௧ିଵ denotes 
total financial wealth, ܪ௜௧ the expected present discounted value of lifetime human wealth, and 
௜ܸ௧ିଵndicates the value of total domestic assets.10 
                                                                          
7  See Forbes et al. (2016). Equation [5] can be written equivalently in terms of a country’s gross asset position.  
8  Gourinchas and Rey (2007) show that a relevant part of the spread between the returns the US enjoys on its foreign 
assets and the returns it pays on its liabilities are due to the composition of its portfolio, whose assets tend to be riskier 
than the liabilities (with a substantial share of safe US treasuries). See also Habib (2010) and Curcuru et al. (2013). 
9  This is illustrated in Figure 2.1 in Appendix 2, which decomposes the IIB into an NFA term (the first term in equation [5]) 
and an interest rate differential term (the second term in [5]). Consider, for example, advanced creditors in Figure 2.1. 
While a negative interest rate differential mitigated their wealth accumulation through the IIB until 2010, in the recent 
years the differential turned positive, which magnified wealth accumulation from investment income. 
10  Note that ௜ܹ௧ିଵ = ܰܨܣ௜௧ିଵ + ௜ܸ௧ିଵ. 
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Expressing the trade balance as the difference between a country’s exports and imports 
and using [6] we can write the trade balance as a share of GDP as:11 
ݐܾ௜௧	 = ൣ߯ଵ + ߯ଶ(ݐ݋ݐ௜௧)ఏ൧
(ଵିఏ)
ఏ ൬ 1ܴܧܧܴ௜௧൰ ሾ݂݋ݎ݁݅݃݊	ܾܽݏ݋ݎ݌ݐ݅݋݊ሿ − 
−ൣ߯ଵ + ߯ଶ(ݐ݋ݐ௧)ିఏ൧
(భషഇ)
ഇ (1 − ߮) ቂቀ ௜೔೟ଵା௚೔೟ቁ ∙ ݂݊ܽ௜௧ିଵ + ቀ
௜೔೟
ଵା௚೔೟
ቁ ∙ ݒ௜௧ିଵ + ℎ௜௧ቃ			      [7] 
where ݐ݋ݐ௜௧ ≡ ൫݌௜௧௛ ݁௜௧݌௜௧௙ൗ ൯ denotes the terms of trade expressed as the ratio between the price 
of country h exports and imports, so that an increase represents an appreciation of the domestic 
currency and implies a real exchange rate appreciation; ܴܧܧܴ௜௧ is the real effective exchange 
rate defined as the home CPI in terms of the foreign, and ߯ଵ and ߯ଶ are positive constants. 
Equation [7] shows that the trade balance should be negatively related to the stock of net foreign 
assets, as a creditor position should tend –everything else equal—to raise the value of total 
financial wealth thereby increasing total domestic absorption (here, consumption) and, therefore, 
imports (wealth effect). The direct impact of stock imbalances on the trade balance is then 
expected to be negative:  
ݐܾ௜௧ = ݂(݂݊ܽ௜௧ିଵᇣᇧᇤᇧᇥ)
ି
. 
Namely, stock imbalances are expected to have a stabilizing impact on wealth 
accumulation through the trade balance, as creditor countries should tend to consume and 
import more, thereby halting the accumulation of external assets. Notice that the relationship 
above was derived under important simplifying assumptions, such as no investment in physical 
capital and no preference shocks, and should hold only controlling for any fluctuation in 
production, growth, labour income and the value of domestic assets.   
Notice also that an appreciation of the domestic currency, determining an appreciation 
of the real exchange rate and of the terms of trade, reduces the international value of foreign 
absorption and shifts world expenditure towards varieties produced abroad, which –everything 
else equal– tends to worsen the trade balance.  
(3) Through the trade balance, in response to cyclical shocks: The economic 
literature provides reasons to believe that the trade balance might be influenced by the stock of 
net foreign assets well beyond the wealth effects described above. Indeed, it has been shown 
that the CA of creditor and debtor countries reacts differently to cyclical income shocks. Namely, 
a positive cyclical shock on income, as reflected in a positive output gap, tends to lead to a more 
pronounced deficit in debtor than in creditor economies (Bussiere et al [2003]). 
Two explanations have been related to these findings. First, in the presence of low 
diminishing asset returns and high risk, agents might not change the composition of their portfolio 
and invest any additional marginal unit of wealth derived from the shock according to the portfolio 
they already have. Then debtors will invest more at home leading to a more pronounced CA deficit 
(Kraay and Ventura [2000]). Another possibility is that debtor economies are more credit constrained 
than creditor ones. Then a positive cyclical income shock would relax credit constraints more in the 
debtor economies, which would end up borrowing relatively more from abroad (Bussiere et al. 
                                                                          
11  To wit, ܶܤ௜௧ = ௜ܲ௧௛ܩܦ ௜ܲ௧ − ௜ܲ௧ܥ௜௧, where Ph  denotes the GDP deflator and P is the CPI. Equations [6] and [7] can be 
derived in any standard 2-country 2-good DSGE model assuming, beyond quadratic utility, that consumption is a CES 
aggregate of a domestic and a foreign-produced variety and that there is no investment in physical capital. 
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[2003]). Notice that, in response to negative cyclical income shocks, the same mechanisms should 
generate higher surpluses in debtor than in creditor countries. 
Whatever the reason why temporary shocks affect differently the CA of creditor and 
debtor countries, we wish to test for this channel as well in our empirical exercises, which should 
materialize through the trade balance.12 Then the total direct impact of stock imbalances on the 
trade balance can be written as: 
	ݐܾ௜௧ = ݂ ൭݂݊ܽ௜௧ିଵᇣᇧᇤᇧᇥ
ି
; ݂݊ܽ௜௧ିଵ ∗ ݌݋ݏ_ܿݕ݈݈ܿ݅ܿܽ௦௛௢௖௞௦ᇣᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇥ
ା
; ݂݊ܽ௜௧ିଵ ∗ ݊݁݃_ܿݕ݈݈ܿ݅ܿܽ௦௛௢௖௞௦ᇣᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇥ
ି
൱, 
where the first term represents the wealth effect, the second one the response of the trade balance 
to positive cyclical income shocks and the third one the response to negative income shocks. Stock 
imbalances are expected to have a destabilizing impact on external dynamics following positive 
cyclical income shocks, as they tend to generate higher trade deficits in debtor than in creditor 
countries. On the other hand, negative cyclical shocks might have a stabilizing impact on the CA, 
as they should tend to reduce creditors’ surpluses and debtors’ deficits.   
Given the relationships derived above, the total direct impact of stock imbalances on 
the CA can be expressed as:13 
ܿܽ௜௧ = ݐܾ௜௧ + ܾ݅݅௜௧ =
= ݂ ൭݂݊ܽ௜௧ିଵᇣᇧᇤᇧᇥ
?
; ݂݊ܽ௜௧ିଵ ∗ ݌݋ݏ_ܿݕ݈݈ܿ݅ܿܽ௦௛௢௖௞ᇣᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇥ
ା
; ݂݊ܽ௜௧ିଵ ∗ ݊݁݃_ܿݕ݈݈ܿ݅ܿܽ௦௛௢௖௞ᇣᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇥ
ି
൱ 
where the first term denotes the net impact of the (allegedly positive) investment income effect 
and the (supposedly negative) wealth effect –its sign being ex-ante undetermined. 
3.2 Indirect impacts through exchange rate fluctuations 
Yet, stock imbalances can also have an indirect impact on the CA and, more generally, on wealth 
accumulation, through exchange rate fluctuations. Indeed, economic theory gives reasons to 
believe that a positive (negative) net foreign asset position should be associated, at least in the 
long run, with a more appreciated (depreciated) exchange rate. The standard argument in the 
literature (see, for example, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti [2004] and all the literature on the so-called 
transfer problem) assumes that a country’s trade balance reacts negatively to exchange rate 
appreciations, which, as [7] illustrates, tend to shift world demand towards foreign-produced 
goods. Then, given the standard equation describing wealth accumulation [2], in a long-run 
equilibrium with a constant net foreign asset position the must hold: 
ݐܾ = −ቀ௥ି௚ଵା௚ቁ ∙ ݂݊ܽ − ݒ݈ܽ.		                                      [9] 
As [9] shows, a creditor country might afford a lower trade balance in the long run and therefore 
a more appreciated exchange rate. Moreover, an increase in the net foreign asset position would 
make the trade balance higher than the right hand side of [9], and an appreciation of the real 
exchange rate would be required to get back to the equilibrium. Therefore, assuming that the 
                                                                          
12  Notice that the IIB is entirely determined by past stocks and current asset returns. 
13  The residual balance includes both items related to the private and the public sector. Therefore, it is not advisable to 
pursue a unified theoretical argument to explain them. The stabilizing/destabilizing impact of external stocks on this sub-
balance will be a purely empirical question.     
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economy tends to the long-run equilibrium or, at least, to preclude explosive NFA dynamics, the 
relationship above implies that: 
ݎ݁݁ݎ௜௧ = ݂(݂݊ܽ௜௧ିଵᇣᇧᇤᇧᇥ
ା
) 
and 
∆ݎ݁݁ݎ௜௧ = ݂(∆݂݊ܽ௜௧ିଵᇣᇧᇤᇧᇥ
ା
), 
where ݎ݁݁ݎ௧ is the (log of the) real effective exchange rate. Creditor countries are expected to 
have a more appreciated exchange rate, and increases in the net foreign asset position are 
expected to give rise to appreciations. Notice that these relationships have been derived 
assuming that the economy tends to a stable long-run equilibrium, and that long-run valuation 
effects, in the form of the spread between returns on assets and liabilities, do not depend on the 
exchange rate, nor does the investment income balance. 
Indirect impact on the current account: The exchange rate, in turn, can affect the CA 
in two ways, namely through the trade balance and, to the extent that they translate into nominal 
fluctuations, through the income balance.  
(4) Indirect impact via exchange rates on the trade balance: As implied by [7], a real 
exchange rate appreciation worsens the trade balance. Then:  
ݐܾ௜௧ =
= ݂
ۉ
ۈ
ۇ݂݊ܽ௜௧ିଵᇣᇧᇤᇧᇥ
ି
; ݂݊ܽ௜௧ିଵ ∗ ݌݋ݏ_ܿݕ݈݈ܿ݅ܿܽ௦௛௢௖௞௦ᇣᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇥ
ା
; ݂݊ܽ௜௧ିଵ ∗ ݊݁݃_ܿݕ݈݈ܿ݅ܿܽ௦௛௢௖௞௦ᇣᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇥ
ି
; ݎ݁݁ݎ௜௧ ൭݂݊ܽ௜௧ିଵᇣᇧᇤᇧᇥ
ା
൱
ᇣᇧᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇧᇥ
ି ی
ۋ
ۊ, 
where the last term denotes the indirect impact of stock imbalances on the trade balance via the 
exchange rate level. Through this channel, stock imbalances are expected to have a stabilizing 
effect on the trade balance as a creditor position should be associated with a more appreciated 
exchange rate, which, in turn, should correspond –everything else equal— to a lower trade 
balance, which should hamper the accumulation of external wealth.  
(5) Indirect impact via exchange rates on the income balance: Turning to the income 
balance, an appreciation of the domestic currency in nominal terms tends to reduce both the 
income from foreign-denominated assets and the payments on foreign-denominated liabilities. 
As shown in [5], this will have an impact on the income balance through the financial-weighted 
exchange rate on assets and liabilities, although the net sign of this effect will depend on the 
currency composition of country i’s portfolio, as well as on interest rates and on the size of gross 
and net holdings. Therefore: 
ܾ݅݅௜௧ = ݂
ۉ
ۈ
ۇ݂݊ܽ௜௧ିଵᇣᇧᇤᇧᇥ
ା
	; ∆݂ݔ݁ݎ௜௧஺ ൭∆݂݊ܽ௜௧ିଵᇣᇧᇤᇧᇥ
ା
൱
ᇣᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇥ
ି
	; ∆݂ݔ݁ݎ௜௧௅ ൭∆݂݊ܽ௜௧ିଵᇣᇧᇤᇧᇥ
ା
൱
ᇣᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇥ
ା ی
ۋ
ۊ,         [10] 
where ∆݂ݔ݁ݎ௧஺  and ∆݂ݔ݁ݎ௧௅  denote the change in the (log of the) financial exchange rate on, 
respectively, assets and liabilities. The existing stock of net foreign assets, ݂݊ܽ௧ିଵ	, might have 
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an indirect impact on the investment income balance through financial exchange rate 
appreciations/depreciations, for a given ݂݊ܽ௧ିଶ. Also, changes in the stock of net foreign assets 
can impact the investment income balance to the extent that they contribute to 
appreciate/depreciate the financial exchange rate. This effect may be stabilizing or destabilizing 
for the accumulation of external wealth and its sign (the net impact of ∆݂ݔ݁ݎ௧஺ and ∆݂ݔ݁ݎ௧௅ on the 
IIB) depends on the currency denomination of assets and liabilities.14  
(6) Indirect impact through valuation changes: As shown in [2], the accumulation of 
external wealth results from both the CA and valuation changes on the existing stock of foreign 
assets and liabilities. Valuation effects, in turn, are partly due to exchange rate changes via 
fluctuations in the nominal financial exchange rate and may therefore be affected by existing 
stock positions, the final sign depending on the currency composition of assets and liabilities. 
Summing up, the impact of existing stock imbalances on the accumulation of external 
wealth can be expressed as: 
∆݂݊ܽ௧
= ݐܾ௧
ۉ
ۈ
ۇ݂݊ܽ௧ିଵᇣᇧᇤᇧᇥ
ି
; ݂݊ܽ௧ିଵ ∗ ݌݋ݏ_ܿݕ݈݈ܿ݅ܿܽ௦௛௢௖௞ᇣᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇥ
ା
; ݂݊ܽ௧ିଵ ∗ ݊݁݃_ܿݕ݈݈ܿ݅ܿܽ௦௛௢௖௞ᇣᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇥ
ି
; ݎ݁݁ݎ௧ ൭݂݊ܽ௧ିଵᇣᇧᇤᇧᇥ
ା
൱
ᇣᇧᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇧᇥ
ି ی
ۋ
ۊ
 
+	ܾ݅݅௧
ۉ
ۈ
ۇ݂݊ܽ௧ିଵᇣᇧᇤᇧᇥ
ା
	; ∆݂݁݁ݎ௧ ൭∆݂݊ܽ௧ିଵᇣᇧᇤᇧᇥ
ା
൱
ᇣᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇥ
? ی
ۋ
ۊ						 
+	ݒ݈ܽ௧
ۉ
ۈ
ۇ∆݂݁݁ݎ௧ ൭∆݂݊ܽ௧ିଵᇣᇧᇤᇧᇥ
ା
൱
ᇣᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇥ
? ی
ۋ
ۊ
                                                  [12] 
Stock imbalances are expected to exert a stabilizing effect on the accumulation of 
external wealth through the trade balance due to wealth effects and in response to cyclical 
decreases in income, as well as through the level of the effective exchange rate, which might be 
counterbalanced by a potentially destabilizing impact in response to positive cyclical income 
shocks. The existing stock of net foreign assets is expected to trigger destabilizing dynamics 
through the investment income balance. A past change in the stock of net foreign assets can 
either increase or decrease the investment income balance by depreciating/appreciating the 
financial exchange rate, depending on the currency of denomination of gross holdings. Finally, 
the impact of past NFA changes on valuation effects is in principle ambiguous and depends, 
again, on the currency composition of assets and liabilities.  
The overall impact of stock imbalances on wealth accumulation, then, turns out to be 
essentially an empirical issue concerning the net impact of all the effects in eq. [12]. In the 
remaining of the paper we will test for these impacts focusing on the effect of stock imbalances 
on CA dynamics –that is abstracting from valuation effects.  
                                                                          
14  The indirect impact of NFA changes on the IIB will have a stabilizing effect, for example, if a country’s assets are mostly 
denominated in foreign currency. Then a positive change in NFA, implying an appreciation of the domestic currency, will 
tend to decrease the domestic-currency value of revenues. 
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4 The impact of stock imbalances on the CA: empirical tests 
In order to test for the empirical relevance of the theoretical impacts illustrated above, we employ 
panel regressions of the CA (over GDP) and its sub-balances, which allow us to estimate the 
impact of the stock of NFA on CA fluctuations (as in the first two terms of eq. [12]) controlling for 
a wide set of possible determinants of external flows. 
For its comprehensive perspective, the starting point for this exploration is the analysis 
performed by the IMF under the multilateral monitoring exercise of external imbalances carried 
out in the Fund’s External Sector Reports (IMF, 2013). The IMF analysis consists of panel 
regressions of countries’ CA on a wide set of possible drivers, including countries’ stock of NFA, 
fundamentals, financial and policy variables. According to IMF estimates, NFA have a statistically 
significant positive impact on the CA balance. This sign is robust to the inclusion of a multiplicity 
of variables.  
Our empirical analysis generalizes IMF CA regressions under two main aspects. First, 
differently from the original framework, in estimating the impact of NFA on the CA we distinguish 
between creditor and debtor countries, motivated by the results obtained in the descriptive 
section. Second, we also study how NFA influence the CA in response to cyclical income shock, 
represented as in Bussiere et al. (2013) by the output gap, distinguishing between periods of 
expansion and recessions, and between creditors and debtors.  
In particular, we estimate two main specifications. A reduced-form specification allows 
focusing in the simplest possible way on the differences between creditors and debtors. It 
assumes that the impact of countries’ output gap on the CA does not vary depending on their 
stock of NFA, that is, that the impact of stock imbalances on the CA in response to cyclical 
shocks is negligible:   
ܿܽ௜௧ = ߙ + ߚଵ ∙ ݂݊ܽ௜௧ିଵ + ߚଶ ∙ ݂݊ܽ௜௧ିଵ ∙ (ܿݎ݁݀݅ݐ݋ݎௗ௨௠) + 
+	ߛ ∙ ݕ݃ܽ݌௜௧ + ߜଵ ∙ ݎ݁݁ݎ௜௧ିଵ + ߜଶ ∙ ∆݂ݔ݁ݎ௜௧ିଵ + (݋ݐℎ݁ݎݏ)௜௧ + ߝ௧.              [13] 
ܿݎ݁݀݅ݐ݋ݎௗ௨௠ is a dummy variable identifying creditor countries and (݋ݐℎ݁ݎݏ) denotes a wide set 
of different controls, such as countries’ demographic factors, aging, level of development, fiscal 
and reserve accumulation policy. 15  NFA coefficients capture the overall impact of stock 
imbalances on the CA of different groups of countries (assuming that NFA do not affect CA 
responses to cyclical shocks). Thus, β1 is the impact of the stock of NFA on the CA of debtor 
economies and (β1+β2) the same for creditor countries. What does these impacts include? Notice 
that, due to potential endogeneity issues, exchange rates only appear lagged in our specification. 
For this reason, NFA coefficients capture both the direct impact of net foreign assets on the CA 
(through wealth effects and investment income) and the indirect one through the effect they have 
on the contemporaneous level of exchange rates (see eq. [12]), acting both through the trade 
balance (real exchange rate) and the investment income balance (financial exchange rate), for 
given ݂݊ܽ௧ିଶ. 
 
                                                                          
15  The full list of control variables is detailed in Appendix 4. 
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To study the effect of NFA in response to cyclical shocks we use an extended 
specification. In this specification NFA appear also interacted with the output gap (ygap): 
ܿܽ௜௧ = ߙ + ߚଵ ∙ ݂݊ܽ௜௧ିଵ + ߚଶ ∙ ݂݊ܽ௜௧ିଵ ∙ (ܿݎ݁݀݅ݐ݋ݎௗ௨௠) + ߚଷ ∙ ݂݊ܽ௜௧ିଵ ∙ (ݕ݃ܽ݌௧) 
																	+ߚସ ∙ ݂݊ܽ௜௧ିଵ ∙ (ݕ݃ܽ݌݊݁ ௜݃௧) + ߚହ ∙ ݂݊ܽ௜௧ିଵ ∙ (ݕ݃ܽ݌௜௧) ∙ (ܿݎ݁݀݅ݐ݋ݎௗ௨௠) 
																								+ߚ଺ ∙ ݂݊ܽ௜௧ିଵ ∙ (ݕ݃ܽ݌݊݁ ௜݃௧) ∙ (ܿݎ݁݀݅ݐ݋ݎௗ௨௠) + ߛ ∙ ݕ݃ܽ݌௜௧ +   
+ߜଵ ∙ ݎ݁݁ݎ௜௧ିଵ + ߜଶ ∙ ∆݂݁݁ݎ௜௧ିଵ + (݋ݐℎ݁ݎݏ)௜௧ + ߝ௧.                [14] 
While in response to positive cyclical shocks NFA are expected to have a destabilizing 
impact on the CA, in principle negative shocks might have a stabilizing impact on external 
balances. For this reason, it is important to distinguishing in the estimation between expansions 
and recessions. When estimating the impact of NFA on the CA following cyclical income shocks, 
we also allow for possible asymmetries between creditor and debtor economies. 
It is important to notice that, as in IMF regressions, the output gap is also included as a 
separate regressor (ߛ ∙ ݕ݃ܽ݌௜௧). Then the interacted coefficients represent the differential impact 
of the output gap on the CA depending on countries’ stock of net debt.  Thus, β3 is the impact 
of NFA following a positive cyclical shock for debtor countries, and (β3+β4) of a negative one. 
Analogously, (β3+β5) is the impact of NFA following positive income shocks for creditor 
economies; (β3+β4+β5) the effect of negative ones. Given the new terms we introduce in this 
extended specification, the coefficients of NFA alone (β1 and β2) estimate the impact of NFA on 
the CA at closed output gaps –that is, they reflect wealth effects, investment income effects and 
indirect effects through exchange rates –all at closed output gaps.   
We present our results including fixed effects in Table 1.16 As in the IMF framework, 
regressions are estimated through a quasi-differenced estimator to deal with potential 
autocorrelation introduced by the slow-moving properties of the CA and NFA.17 In the baseline 
specification of the first column, in which we do not distinguish between creditor and debtor 
economies, results are similar to those of IMF regressions: NFA have a positive impact on the 
current account balance, although this effect is not statistically significant in our case.18 This 
result is, however, hiding a remarkable asymmetry between creditor and debtor countries. As 
shown in column (2), when we estimate the reduced-form regression [13], which allows the 
current account balances of debtors and creditors to react differently to NFA, we find that in 
debtors the stock of net liabilities limits CA deficits and contains future debt accumulation  
(the coefficient of NFA is negative and significant). The stabilizing impact of the stock of net 
debt seems to be milder for highly indebted countries –those with a stock of external debt that 
exceeds 80% of GDP: the coefficient of NFA for these economies is -0.007 (-0.019+0.012) 
and not statistically significant. In creditor countries, on the other hand, stock imbalances are 
                                                                          
16  In this and the following Tables of this section only the main parameters of interest are presented. Yet, as emphasized 
in the main text, regressions include a wide set of other variables commonly used in external balance regressions. 
Detailed results are shown in Appendix 4. Notice also that our baseline regressions include fixed effects. As fixed effects 
would capture the net effect of time-invariant unobservable variables, we tend to consider this specification more robust 
to possible omitted variable bias. Still, this specification might not be valid in the very long run, as it would imply that 
some countries are permanently in external deficit or surplus. Therefore, it should be understood in a context of high 
persistence of external balances. Appendix 4 presents regression results excluding fixed effects. It shows that most of 
the findings obtained –in particular those related to the asymmetries between creditors and debtors– are robust to the 
exclusion of fixed effects. As in IMF (2013), the regressors considered endogenous were instrumented with their fitted 
values according to the regressions reported in Appendix 3. 
17  In particular, we use a pooled GLS with panel-wide AR1 correction. See IMF (2013).  
18  The coefficient gets statistically significant without fixed effects (see Appendix 4), as in IMF (2013). 
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highly destabilizing: creditors’ positive stock of NFA tends to increase CA surpluses and to 
boost future wealth accumulation (the coefficient of NFA for creditors takes a value of 0.042 
with a p-value of 0.000). 
Table 1. Current account regressions 
 
Baseline 
specif. 
(1) 
Diff. btw. creditors 
& debtors 
(2) 
Valuation 
effects 
(3) 
Cyclical 
shocks 
(4) 
Cyclical shocks  
(exp. vs rec.) 
(5) 
Cyclical shocks w/o 
non-linearities 
(6) 
Net foreign assets (L) 
0.003 
(0.005) 
-0.019** 
(0.008) 
- 
-0.019** 
(0.008) 
-0.031*** 
(0.008) 
-0.023*** 
(0.007) 
Net foreign assets  creditor 
countries (L) 
- 
0.062*** 
(0.014) 
- 
0.062*** 
(0.014) 
0.078*** 
(0.015) 
0.067*** 
(0.013) 
Net foreign assets highly 
indebted countries 
(NFA/GDP < -80%) (L) 
- 
0.012** 
(0.005) 
0.012** 
(0.005) 
0.012** 
(0.005) 
0.010** 
(0.005) 
- 
Net foreign assets. CA 
accumulation (L) 
- - 
-0.017* 
(0.010) 
- - - 
Net foreign assets. 
Valuation effects (L) 
- - 
-0.023** 
(0.009) 
- - - 
Net foreign assets creditor 
countries. CA 
accumulation (L) 
- - 
0.065*** 
(0.014) 
- - - 
Net foreign assets 
creditor countries. 
Valuation effects (L) 
- - 
0.049*** 
(0.017) 
- - - 
Net foreign assets *  
output gap (L) 
- - - 
0.108 
(0.100) 
0.596*** 
(0.157) 
0.597*** 
(0.158) 
Net foreign assets * 
negative output gap (L) 
- - - - 
-0.791*** 
(0.210) 
-0.835*** 
(0.210) 
Net foreign assets *  
output gap creditors (L) 
- - - - 
-1.39** 
(0.593) 
-1.38** 
(0.593) 
Net foreign assets * 
negative output gap 
creditors (L) 
- - - - 
1.60* 
(0.886) 
1.65* 
(0.886) 
Real effective trade  
weighted exchange rate (L) 
0.007 
(0.008) 
0.008 
(0.007) 
0.008 
(0.007) 
0.008 
(0.008) 
0.003 
(0.007) 
0.003 
(0.007) 
Nom. eff. FX financial (DL) 
-0.010* 
(0.006) 
-0.010* 
(0.006) 
-0.010* 
(0.006) 
-0.010* 
(0.005) 
-0.010* 
(0.006) 
-0.010* 
(0.006) 
Obs. 1164 1164 1164 1164 1164 1164 
R2 0.6591 0.6758 0.6796 0.6769 0.6852 0.6865 
Between brackets: standard deviation; L: lagged variable; D: first differences; *, **, *** p-value below 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
Net external assets derive both from the accumulation of past current account balances 
and from valuation effects on financial assets. It could be argued that, as capital gains are very 
volatile, the marginal propensity to spend out of them might be lower than out of NFA 
accumulated through past CA surpluses. Perhaps this could explain why stabilizing wealth 
effects do not seem to be dominant in the case of creditor countries. Thus, in the third column 
of the Table we substitute the NFA regressor with NFA due to past CA accumulation and those 
due to valuation effects.19 Differences between the CA and the valuation component of NFA are 
not statistically significant, neither for debtor nor for creditor countries. Moreover, asymmetries 
between creditors and debtors survive when we only look at the CA component of NFA. This 
seems to indicate that a lower marginal propensity to spend out of capital gains does not explain 
differences in the impact of stock imbalances on the CA across debtor and creditor economies.  
In columns (4) and (5) we interact lagged NFA with the output gap, to check whether 
cyclical income disturbances affect countries’ CA depending on their stock of NFA. The interaction 
term is not significant in column (4), but, when, in column (5), we estimate the extended specification 
[14] considering separately positive and negative output gaps and allowing the coefficient to differ 
across debtor and creditor economies, we find that the higher the stock of debtors’ net external 
                                                                          
19  To obtain these two variables we impose that, in the first year of the sample (1979 for most countries), capital gains are zero.   
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liabilities, the more their CA deficit increases in response to positive cyclical income shocks, with a 
destabilizing effect on the accumulation of external debt. The stock of NFA, on the other hand, has 
not significant impact on debtors’ CA dynamics in response to negative cyclical shocks. 
Coefficients are estimated very imprecisely for creditor countries, yet it seems that creditors’ stock 
of NFA does not affect their CA response to cyclical shocks (the sum of coefficients for creditors is 
not statistically different from zero). These findings suggest that after positive cyclical shocks debtor 
countries prefer to keep unchanged the composition of their portfolio, implying a relatively higher 
increase in their deficit. Another possibility is that debtor economies, who might face tighter financial 
conditions, see these restrictions being relaxed following a positive shock and are able to increase 
relatively more domestic spending.  
The extended specification in column (5) embeds all the theoretical effects that the stock 
of NFA should have on CA dynamics. It shows that, even when we consider the effect of cyclical 
shocks, the destabilizing impact of NFA on debtors’ CA dynamics in response to these 
disturbances is of a second order of importance with respect to the stabilizing effect they exert at 
closed output gaps. Indeed, the coefficients estimated in (5) imply that stock imbalances have, 
overall, a stabilizing impact on the CA of debtor countries (both highly indebted and not), and a 
destabilizing effect on the external wealth accumulation of creditor economies. Namely, for net 
foreign assets on average around -30% of GDP for debtors (-100% for highly indebted countries) 
and around 28% of GDP for creditors, as in our sample, and given the average size of positive 
output gaps, debtor countries will reduce their current account deficit by 0.6-0.9% of GDP per year 
(depending on whether they are highly indebted or not), while creditors would increase their surplus 
by 1.3%. These effects contrast with the results of the IMF, which, disregarding asymmetries in the 
coefficient of NFA across groups of countries, estimate a coefficient of 0.015 for both creditors and 
debtors. This implies a much lower destabilizing impact of stock imbalances for creditors (additional 
surplus of 0.4% GDP per year) and a destabilizing effect for debtors (additional deficit of 0.45 - 
1.5%). As shown in column (6), the overall asymmetric impact of NFA on the CA of creditors and 
debtors is robust to the exclusion of non-linearities in the group of debtors. 
In order to find the source of these asymmetries, in the next sub-sections we analyze 
the two main sub-balances of the current account –the investment income and trade balance. 
The results obtained for the residual sub-balance, which includes public and private capital 
transfers, among others, are presented in Appendix 5. 
4.1 Through the investment income balance 
As we saw in section 2, the investment income balance is the most persistent component of the 
current account. This is not surprising since, according to the theoretical section, it has a very 
close connection with net financial assets through profitability. Since profitability in large sample 
averages and aggregate portfolios (as used herein) is expected to be positive, the investment 
income balance should be positively related to net foreign assets.20 
The baseline regression in the first column provides the expected results. The coefficient 
of NFA is positive, statistically significant and its value seems consistent with the observed implicit 
returns. From the point of view of the asymmetries between creditor and debtor countries, the 
origin of the asymmetric impact of NFA on CA dynamics does not appear to be in this sub-
                                                                          
20  It is useful to remember that changes in the financial exchange rates only enter lagged one period in this specification. 
For this reason, the coefficient of net foreign assets estimated here captures both the direct impact of this variable on 
the IIB (a positive NFA should imply more revenues from abroad than payments to foreigners) and their indirect impact 
through financial exchange rate changes, for a given ݂݊ܽ௧ିଶ (see eq.[12]). 
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balance (columns 2 and 3), which does not seem to present significant differences according to 
the origin of the accumulation of net financial assets (column 4). 
Table 2. Investment income balance regressions 
 
Baseline 
spec. 
(1) 
Diff. btw. creditors 
& debtors 
(2) 
Diff. btw. creditors 
& debtors w/ non-
linearities 
(3) 
Valuation  
effects 
(4) 
Net foreign assets (L) 
0.026***  
(0.003) 
0.026*** 
(0.004) 
0.024*** 
(0.004) 
- 
Net foreign assets creditor 
countries (L) 
- 
-0.001 
(0.009) 
0.001 
(0.009) 
- 
Net foreign assets highly 
indebted countries 
(NFA/GDP < -80%) (L) 
- - 
0.002 
(0.003) 
- 
Weight of equity instr.  
in ext. assets (L) 
0.013* 
(0.007) 
0.013* 
(0.007) 
0.013* 
(0.007) 
0.011 
(0.007) 
Net foreign assets.  
CA accumulation (L) 
- - - 
0.030*** 
(0.004) 
Net foreign assets. 
Valuation effects (L) 
- - - 
0.022*** 
(0.005) 
Net foreign assets creditor 
countries * CA 
accumulation (L) 
- - - 
0.001 
(0.008) 
Net foreign assets creditor 
countries * Valuation 
effects (L) 
- - - 
-0.011 
(0.012) 
Nom. eff. FX financial 
weights asset side (LD) 
-0.004  
(0.005) 
-0.004 
(0.005) 
-0.004 
(0.005) 
-0.004 
(0.005) 
Nom. eff. FX financial 
weights liabilities side (LD) 
0.010  
(0.007) 
0.010 
(0.007) 
0.010 
(0.007) 
0.010 
(0.007) 
Obs. 1164 1164 1164 1164 
R2 0.8264 0.8264 0.8268 0.8303 
See previous table. 
4.2 Through the trade balance  
The trade balance captures the exchanges of goods and services among countries. As such, it 
presents significant cyclical fluctuations, which depend on the evolution of relative income and 
wealth. The theoretical section showed how net financial assets, being a component of wealth, 
should influence these fluctuations. Specifically, they should help stabilize the trade balance, as 
higher (lower) wealth implies buying abroad more (less) goods than you sell.  
In Table 3 we present the estimates of the main coefficients of interest in trade balance 
regressions, leaving the full set of results for Appendix 4 (Table 4.3). In the baseline specification 
(column 1) the coefficient of NFA is negative and statistically significant, implying they are stabilizing. 
Testing for the existence of differences between creditors and debtors as in [13] shows that the 
trade balance may be the source of the asymmetric impact of stock imbalances on the current 
account of debtor and creditor economies (column 2). Indeed, the stabilizing impact of NFA on the 
trade balance is verified only for debtor countries, and not for creditors. For the latter group the 
coefficient is positive (0.031) and statistically significant, with a p-value of 0.007. Recall that the 
coefficient estimated for NFA captures both their direct impact through wealth effects and the 
indirect one through the impact they may have on the contemporaneous level of the real exchange 
rate. Therefore, the lack of stabilization provided in the trade balance by the stock of creditors’ net 
foreign assets could be due either to low wealth effects for constant relative prices (determined, for 
instance, by a low marginal propensity to consume out of external wealth, or a particularly high 
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home-bias which orients expenditure towards home-produced goods leaving the trade balance 
unaffected) or to a lack of stabilization of real exchange movements.  
Column (2) also shows that the stabilizing effect of the stock of net debt on the trade 
balance seems to be less pronounced for highly indebted countries, although the coefficient is 
only borderline significant (p-value 0.12). This might be due to the fact that a marginal increase 
in the external debt of highly indebted economies contracts their imports less, at the margin, with 
respect to debtors with a lower stock of external liabilities, given perhaps the already high 
contraction experienced at lower indebtedness levels.21  
Table 3. Trade balance regressions 
 
Basic 
specif. 
(1) 
Diff. btw. 
creditors & 
debtors 
(2) 
Valuation 
effects 
(3) 
Cyclical 
shocks 
(4) 
Cyclical shocks  
(exp. vs rec.) 
(5) 
Net foreign assets (L) -0.015*** 
(0.006) 
-0.035*** 
(0.008) 
- 
-0.035*** 
(0.008) 
-0.043*** 
(0.008) 
Net foreign assets  creditor 
countries (L) - 
0.065*** 
(0.015) - 
0.066*** 
(0.014) 
0.072*** 
(0.015) 
Net foreign assets highly 
indebted countries 
(NFA/GDP < -80%) (L) 
- 
0.006 
(0.005) 
0.006 
(0.004) 
0.008 
(0.004) 
0.005 
(0.005) 
Net foreign assets. CA 
accumulation (L) - - 
-0.033*** 
(0.009) 
- - 
Net foreign assets. 
Valuation effects (L) - - 
-0.034*** 
(0.010) 
- - 
Net foreign assets creditor 
countries. CA 
accumulation (L) 
- - 
0.071*** 
(0.014) 
- - 
Net foreign assets creditor 
countries. Valuation  
effects (L) 
- - 
0.050*** 
(0.019) 
- - 
Net foreign assets * output 
gap (L) - - - 
0.083 
(0.105) 
0.754*** 
(0.197) 
Net foreign assets * 
negative output gap (L) - - - - 
-1.07*** 
(0.288) 
Net foreign assets * output 
gap creditors (L)     
-0.640 
(0.464) 
Net foreign assets * 
negative output gap 
creditors (L) 
    
0.847 
(0.665) 
Real effective trade 
weighted exchange rate (L) 
-0.009 
(0.006) 
-0.007 
(0.006) 
-0.007 
(0.006) 
0.002 
(0.006) 
0.001 
(0.006) 
Obs. 1261 1261 1261 1261 1261 
R2 0.7204 0.7341 0.7355 0.7593 0.7621 
See previous tables. 
One possible explanation for the destabilizing impact of NFA in creditor countries is that 
they prefer not consuming out of valuation changes due to their high volatility. The results in 
column 3 do not seem to support this hypothesis. Although creditor countries have a somewhat 
smaller marginal propensity to spend out of their capital gains on net foreign wealth, the 
difference is not significant. Also, asymmetries between creditors and debtors persist when we 
only compare the coefficients of NFA due to past CA accumulation. 
Finally, the last column of the table shows that favorable cyclical income shocks tend to 
boost trade deficits in debtor countries. Differences in creditors’ responses to cyclical shocks 
                                                                          
21  Without non-linearities the coefficient of NFA for creditors is still statistically different from debtors’ one, with a value of -
0.028 and a p-value of 0.000. 
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seem to be confirmed in the trade balance regression, although the coefficients are estimated 
very imprecisely (as in CA regressions) and differences are borderline not significant.  
Summarizing the findings of this section, we find that stock imbalances lead to 
destabilizing dynamics only for creditor countries, that is, a creditor position tends to lead to 
further wealth accumulation through the CA. This is basically the consequence of what happens 
with the trade balance, which does not limit wealth accumulation in creditor economies. Debtor 
countries, on the contrary, tend to consume and import less due precisely to their stock of 
external debt. This asymmetry could be reflecting either characteristics that do not make the 
trade balance react much to increases in external wealth or a lack of stabilization of relative prices 
in response to changes in creditors’ NFA. We try to explore these issues further in section 5.   
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5 The heterogeneity between advanced and emerging countries 
As we saw in section 2, the behaviour of the external flows and stocks of advanced and emerging 
economies has been very different in our sample period. Thus, in order to check the possible 
dependency of the results on countries’ development level, we repeat the estimations dividing 
the sample among developed and emerging economies. It should be noted that this reduces 
significantly the sample size, especially in the case of emerging market creditors (essentially 
China), so that the conclusions should be taken with due caution. 
Table 4 presents a summary of the results.22 Current account asymmetries are only 
statistically significant for the group of advanced economies, with NFA having a stabilizing effect 
on debtors and a destabilizing impact on creditors. Besides, for this group of countries neither 
non-linear effects nor transitory income shocks seem to play a relevant role. On the contrary, in 
the case of emerging market economies, the interaction coefficient of lagged NFA and the 
creditor dummy is not statistically significant, so that there seem to be no significant asymmetry 
in the CA dynamics depending of creditors and debtors. In fact, the non-interacted coefficient of 
NFA is negative, implying a stabilizing impact of stock imbalances on wealth accumulation. 
However, there exists certain support for non-linear effects that go in the opposite direction, and, 
more importantly from a quantitative point of view, for destabilizing transitory income shocks. 
This result is coherent with the idea that emerging economies are more credit constrained than 
advanced countries. 
Table 4. Current account regressions. Advanced and emerging economies 
 Advanced Emerging  
 
Basic 
specif. 
(1) 
Diff. btw. 
creditors & 
debtors 
 (2) 
Cyclical shocks 
w/o non-
linearities 
 (3) 
Basic 
specif. 
(4) 
Diff. btw. 
creditors & 
debtors 
(5) 
Cyclical 
shocks w/o 
non-linearities 
(6) 
Net foreign assets (L) 0.004 
(0.006) 
-0.015* 
(0.008) 
-0.013* 
(0.008) 
-0.010 
(0.013) 
-0.028* 
(0.015) 
-0.040*** 
(0.015) 
Net foreign assets  creditor 
countries (L) - 
0.061*** 
(0.014) 
0.063*** 
(0.014) 
- 
0.024 
(0.071) 
0.006 
(0.094) 
Net foreign assets highly 
indebted countries 
(NFA/GDP < -80%) (L) 
- 
0.002 
(0.006) 
- - 
0.020** 
(0.009) 
- 
Net foreign assets * output 
gap (L) - - 
0.110 
(0.202) 
- - 
0.790*** 
(0.220) 
Net foreign assets * 
negative output gap (L) - - 
0.084 
(0.278) 
- - 
-1.197*** 
(0.286) 
Net foreign assets * output 
gap creditors (L) - - 
-1.080* 
(0.607) 
- - 
-4.522 
(5.193) 
Net foreign assets * 
negative output gap 
creditors (L) 
- - 
0.943 
(0.909) 
- - 
1.430 
(7.756) 
Real effective trade  
weighted exchange rate (L) 
-0.026*** 
(0.010) 
-0.029*** 
(0.009) 
-0.031*** 
(0.009) 
0.026*** 
(0.009) 
0.027*** 
(0.009) 
0.020** 
(0.009) 
Nom. eff. FX financial (DL) -0.005 
(0.008) 
-0.001 
(0.008) 
-0.000 
(0.008) 
-0.011 
(0.008) 
-0.010 
(0.008) 
-0.014* 
(0.007) 
Obs. 782 782 782 382 382 382 
R2 0.7389 0.7681 0.7748 0.5379 0.5402 0.5730 
See previous tables. 
                                                                          
22  Full regressions, with and without fixed effects, are reported in Appendix 6.  
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Another relevant result is that the lagged real effective exchange rate is negatively signed 
(as expected) and statistically significant for both groups of countries, while it was non-significant 
for the full sample. Fluctuations in the nominal financial-weighted exchange rate are significant 
only for emerging markets, where the currency composition of external assets and liabilities is 
more relevant. 
Turning now the attention to the investment income balance, as expected, NFA have a 
destabilizing effect in both advanced and emerging markets. The estimated coefficient is higher 
in the case of emerging economies, in accordance with the higher interest rate spreads that are 
usually observed for them in financial markets. As in the full sample, neither for advanced 
economies nor for emerging markets there exist asymmetric effects between creditors and 
debtors. Consistently with the higher interest rate that is usually demanded to highly indebted 
economies, the non-linear coefficient is positive, although estimated very imprecisely. With 
respect to the effect of portfolio composition, the results obtained for advanced economies were 
in line with our a priori: the higher the percentage of equity instruments the higher the revenues 
from the external portfolio. In the case of emerging economies, however, the estimated 
coefficient is negative and statistically significant. This suggests that, as it actually happens in 
some countries, the profitability of equity is lower than that of debt. 
Table 5. Income balance regressions. Advanced and emerging economies 
 Advanced Emerging  
 
Basic 
spec. 
(1) 
Diff. btw. 
creditors & 
debtors 
(2) 
Diff. btw. 
creditors & 
debtors w/  
non-linearities 
(3) 
Basic 
spec. 
(4) 
Diff. btw. 
creditors & 
debtors 
(5) 
Diff. btw. creditors 
& debtors w/  
non-linearities 
(6) 
Net foreign assets (L) 0.021*** 
(0.004) 
0.022*** 
(0.005) 
0.022*** 
(0.006) 
0.034*** 
(0.006) 
0.034*** 
(0.006) 
0.031*** 
(0.007) 
Net foreign assets  
creditor countries (L) - 
-0.004 
(0.010) 
-0.003 
(0.011) 
- 
-0.012 
(0.019) 
-0.008 
(0.020) 
Net foreign assets highly 
indebted countries 
(NFA/GDP < -80%) (L) 
- - 
0.001 
(0.003) 
- - 
0.003 
(0.004) 
Weight of equity instr. in 
ext. assets (L) 
0.033*** 
(0.010) 
0.034*** 
(0.011) 
0.034*** 
(0.011) 
-0.020** 
(0.008) 
-0.019** 
(0.009) 
-0.019** 
(0.009) 
Nom. eff. FX financial 
weights asset side (LD) 
0.004 
(0.008) 
0.003 
(0.008) 
0.003 
(0.008) 
-0.004 
(0.006) 
-0.004 
(0.006) 
-0.005 
(0.006) 
Nom. eff. FX financial 
weights liabilities side (LD) 
-0.005 
(0.012) 
-0.004 
(0.012) 
-0.004 
(0.012) 
0.012 
(0.009) 
0.012 
(0.009) 
0.013 
(0.009) 
Obs. 782 782 782 382 382 382 
R2 0.8615 0.8616 0.8617 0.6879 0.6881 0.6879 
See previous table. 
Finally we analyse the main source of the asymmetries for the whole sample: the trade 
balance. Table 6 summarizes the main outcomes. As it happened with the full sample, now the 
results are sharper. For both advanced and emerging economies NFA are destabilizing for 
creditor countries and stabilizing for debtor ones. However, the point estimates show these 
effects are stronger for the least developed countries. Moreover, the interaction of transitory 
income shocks with NFA are only relevant for emerging economies, thus confirming the previous 
interpretation of transitory shocks as capturing the higher credit constraints that emerging 
markets are subject to. As for the real effective exchange rate, we find that it is only statistically 
significant and negative for advanced economies. This is quite an unexpected result. Since 
emerging countries produce goods and services with a lowest level of sophistication, we were 
expecting relative prices playing a more relevant role for them. However, it should be reminded, 
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first, that we include other controls in the regression that could be determinants of the real 
exchange rate, and, second, that, since the sample of emerging economies is relatively reduced, 
we are probably excluding very important trade partners, which could make our real exchange 
rate not a very good proxy of their price competitiveness.        
Table 6. Trade balance regressions. Advanced and emerging economies 
 Advanced Emerging  
 
Basic 
specif. 
(1) 
Diff. btw. 
creditors & 
debtors 
(2) 
Cyclical 
shocks w/o 
non-linearities 
(3) 
Basic 
specif. 
(4) 
Diff. btw. 
creditors & 
debtors 
(5) 
Cyclical shocks 
w/o non-linearities 
(6) 
Net foreign assets  (L) -0.016*** 
(0.006) 
-0.037*** 
(0.010) 
-0.034*** 
(0.008) 
-0.032*** 
(0.012) 
-0.053*** 
(0.015) 
-0.056*** 
(0.014) 
Net foreign assets  creditor 
countries (L) - 
0.062*** 
(0.016) 
0.060*** 
(0.015) 
- 
0.158*** 
(0.059) 
0.108 
(0.071) 
Net foreign assets highly 
indebted countries 
(NFA/GDP < -80%) (L) 
- 
0.005 
(0.005) 
- - 
0.012 
(0.008) 
- 
Net foreign assets * output 
gap (L) - - 
0.318 
(0.266) 
- - 
1.128*** 
(0.264) 
Net foreign assets * 
negative output gap (L) - - 
-0.424 
(0.417) 
- - 
-1.496*** 
(0.387) 
Net foreign assets * output 
gap creditors (L) - - 
-0.412 
(0.495) 
- - 
1.807 
(3.376) 
Net foreign assets * 
negative output gap 
creditors (L) 
- - 
0.761 
(0.716) 
- - 
-3.586 
(4.239) 
Real effective trade 
weighted exchange rate (L) 
-0.020** 
(0.009) 
-0.020** 
(0.009) 
-0.026*** 
(0.009) 
0.004 
(0.008) 
0.009 
(0.008) 
0.021*** 
(0.008) 
Obs. 840 840 816 421 421 412 
R2 0.7742 0.7913 0.8059 0.6321 0.6416 0.7089 
See previous tables. 
 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 34 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1742 
6 Are real effective exchange rates determined by net foreign assets? 
As emphasized in section 4, the coefficient of net foreign assets estimated in trade balance 
regressions represents both their direct impact through wealth effects and the indirect impact 
that the stock of NFA has on external trade through the real exchange rate. Is the low coefficient 
estimated for creditor countries due to a weak wealth effect and a scarce marginal propensity to 
consume out of external wealth or to the fact that a higher level of net foreign assets does not 
correspond to a more appreciated exchange rate for these countries? In order to address this 
question we focus in this section on the latter, indirect effect, trying to establish its empirical 
relevance and whether it is milder for creditor countries. Another possibility is that the indirect 
impact of stock imbalances on the trade balance via real exchange rate levels could have 
changed over time for several economies in our sample. In particular, the creation of the 
European Monetary Union and the ensuing exchange rate unification under the euro for member 
countries is a structural change that may have affected that relation. So, even if stock imbalances 
had a stabilizing impact on the trade balance through the real exchange rate, this effect may 
have been mitigated for member countries. For one thing, in the presence of rigidities in relative 
price adjustments, the real exchange rate of the members of a common currency area might 
depend on the net foreign asset position of the area as a whole rather than on the external 
position of each member. We test this hypothesis in this section by establishing whether a 
country’s past stock of net foreign assets influences its real exchange rate level, and whether 
this relationship changed for euro countries after the establishment of the common currency. 
Our tests rely on panel regressions of the level of the REER on a set of fundamental 
determinants, including the ratio of NFA to GDP. 23 In the spirit of the REER regressions in IMF 
(2013) and IMF (2016), our basic specification controls for a series of potential determinants of 
the REER level, such as a country’s level of development, its trade openness, demographic 
factors and expected growth. We also test whether the impact of the stock of NFA on the 
exchange rate is the same for debtor and creditor countries. Namely, we run the following 
regressions:  
ݎ݁݁ݎ௜௧ = ߙ + ߚ ∙ ݂݊ܽ௜௧ିଵ + (݋ݐℎ݁ݎݏ)௜௧ + ߝ௜௧ 
ݎ݁݁ݎ௜௧ = ߙ + ߚଵ ∙ ݂݊ܽ௜௧ିଵ + ߚଶ ∙ ݂݊ܽ௜௧ିଵ ∙ (ܿݎ݁݀݅ݐ݋ݎௗ௨௠) + (݋ݐℎ݁ݎݏ)௜௧ + ߝ௜௧, 
where ݎ݁݁ݎ௧  is the (log of the) REER level. Notice that using levels instead of indices allows 
running panel estimations both with and without fixed effects.24 ߚଵ is the impact of the NFA stock 
on the REER for debtor economies and (ߚଵ + ߚଶ) the same for creditor countries; (݋ݐℎ݁ݎݏ) 
denotes the set of other exchange rate determinants, detailed in Appendix 7.  
We test whether the relationship between NFA and REER changed significantly for the 
countries that joined the Euro Area in 1999 by running: 
                                                                          
23  The levels of the real effective exchange rate are recovered from PPP estimates in a base year. 
24  On this point see IMF (2013). Being able to run panel regressions without fixed effects is particularly important when 
estimating the relationship between the stock of NFA and the REER. Indeed, economic theory predicts a positive link 
between these two variables based on long-run (Steady State) relationships. Fixed effects might capture that link and 
mechanically lead to estimate a non-significant coefficient. For this reason the benchmark estimates for REER 
regressions (those reported in the main text) are run without fixed effects. Still, we discuss the robustness of our results 
to fixed effect estimation, which is reported in Appendix 7.   
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ݎ݁݁ݎ௜௧ = ߙ + ߚଵ݂݊ܽ௜௧ିଵ + ߚଶ݂݊ܽ௜௧ିଵ(ܿݎ݁݀݅ݐ݋ݎௗ௨௠) + ߚଷ݂݊ܽ௜௧ିଵ(݌݋ݏݐܧܼௗ௨௠)
+			ߚସ݂݊ܽ௜௧ିଵ(ܿݎ݁݀݅ݐ݋ݎௗ௨௠)(݌݋ݏݐܧܼௗ௨௠)
+ 			ߚହ݂݊ܽ௜௧ିଵ(݌݋ݏݐܧܼௗ௨௠)(ܧܼܾ݉݁݉݁ݎ99ௗ௨௠)
+ 			ߚ଺݂݊ܽ௜௧ିଵ(݌݋ݏݐܧܼௗ௨௠)(ܧܼܾ݉݁݉݁ݎ99ௗ௨௠)(ܿݎ݁݀݅ݐ݋ݎௗ௨௠)
+ (݋ݐℎ݁ݎݏ)௜௧ + ߝ௜௧, 
where (݌݋ݏݐܧܼௗ௨௠) is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 after the creation of the Euro 
Zone, in 1999, and (ܧܼܾ݉݁݉݁ݎ99ௗ௨௠) is a static dummy that characterizes the countries that 
joined the EMU in 1999 plus Greece.25  
The specification above lets us study whether the NFA coefficient changed after 1999 
also for economies outside the Euro Area. However, that specification does not allow 
investigating the impact of the Euro on the countries that joined the single currency after 1999. 
For this reason we also run a slightly different regression interacting NFA and NFA for creditors 
with a dummy (ܧܼܾ݉݁݉݁ݎௗ௨௠) that takes the value of 1 if the country has already joined the 
Euro in the year under consideration, and 0 otherwise: 
ݎ݁݁ݎ௜௧ = ߙ + ߚଵ݂݊ܽ௜௧ିଵ + ߚଶ݂݊ܽ௜௧ିଵ(ܿݎ݁݀݅ݐ݋ݎௗ௨௠) + ߚଷ݂݊ܽ௜௧ିଵ(ܧܼܾ݉݁݉݁ݎௗ௨௠)
+ 				ߚସ݂݊ܽ௜௧ିଵ(ܧܼܾ݉݁݉݁ݎௗ௨௠)(ܿݎ݁݀݅ݐ݋ݎௗ௨௠) + (݋ݐℎ݁ݎݏ)௜௧ + ߝ௜௧. 
The country sample is the same as in Section 4. The time sample is 1990-2015, due to 
data availability. Table 7.1 in Appendix 7 reports the full set of results. Table 7 below focuses on 
the results obtained for our main coefficients of interest, those related to countries’ NFA position.   
The baseline specification in column (1) shows that, controlling for all the determinants 
of REER levels, on average countries with a more positive NFA position tend to display a more 
appreciated exchange rate. Contrary to our conjecture, when we distinguish between debtor 
and creditor countries in column (2), we find that the relationship above holds only for the latter 
group, that is, a higher debtor position does not imply a more depreciated exchange rate.26 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                          
25  The coefficients ߚଵ	and (ߚଵ + ߚଶ) capture the impact of NFA on the REER for, respectively, debtor and creditor countries 
before the establishment of the Euro Zone; (ߚଵ + ߚଷ)	 and (ߚଵ + ߚଶ + ߚଷ + ߚସ)  the same impact after 1999 for, 
respectively, debtor and creditor economies outside the EMU; (ߚଵ + ߚଷ + ߚହ) represents the impact after 1999 for 
debtor countries that joined the Euro Zone; summing all the ߚݏ yields instead the same effect after 1999 for creditor 
countries that joined the Euro Zone since its creation. 
26  The coefficient of the lagged foreign assets position for creditor countries is estimated to be 0.349, with a p-value of 
0.000. 
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Table 7. Real effective exchange rate regressions 
 
Baseline 
spec. 
(1) 
Diff. btw cred. & 
deb. 
(2) 
1999- Euro Zone 
break 
(3) 
Euro Zone member 
dummy 
(4) 
Net foreign assets  (L) 0.108*** 
(0.029) 
-0.065** 
(0.032) 
0.113 
(0.076) 
0.028 
(0.045) 
Net foreign assets creditor 
countries (L) - 
0.414*** 
(0.056) 
0.407*** 
(0.107) 
0.323*** 
(0.069) 
NFA*postEZdummy (L) - - 
-0.176** 
(0.076) 
- 
NFA creditors * postEZdummy 
(L) - - 
-0.006 
(0.097) 
- 
NFA 99EuroMember * 
postEZdummy (L) - - 
-0.016 
(0.046) 
- 
NFA 99EuroMember creditor * 
postEZdummy (L) - - 
-0.285*** 
(0.094) 
- 
NFA *EuroMember (L) - - - 
-0.161*** 
(0.047) 
NFA creditors* EuroMember (L) - - - 
-0.123 
(0.099) 
Obs. 977 977 977 977 
Country fixed effects No No No No 
R2 0.8277 0.8434 0.8496 0.8488 
  
Column (3) shows that before the creation of the Euro Zone creditor countries enjoyed 
a significant stabilization from REER fluctuations, as a more positive NFA position corresponded 
to a more appreciated exchange rate, which should have limited creditors’ trade surpluses and 
halted to some extent the accumulation of external wealth. After 1999 this effect is found to be 
lower for all creditor countries, irrespectively of whether they joined or not the Euro Zone. Yet, 
after 1999 creditor economies outside the common currency area have still benefited from a 
significantly more appreciated REER for a higher NFA position. Creditor countries that joined the 
Euro since 1999, instead, have experimented a much bigger reduction in the link between NFA 
and the REER, which has practically vanished.27 
The regression in column (4) allows including among Euro members those that joined 
the common currency after 1999. Consistently with the results obtained in column 3, we find that 
for creditor countries outside the Euro Area a higher NFA position corresponds to a more 
appreciated REER. For creditor economies that are members of the EMU this effect is more than 
halved and not statistically significant.28 Still, preliminary evidence suggests that the reduction in 
the positive link between NFA and REER experimented by creditors that joined the Euro Zone is 
not what explains the destabilizing impact of their NFA on the trade balance. Indeed, isolating 
NFA effects in TB regression for Euro Area countries and the rest, we find that for debtor 
countries that are members of the Euro Zone the stabilizing impact of NFA is higher and for Euro 
Area creditor countries their destabilizing impact is actually lower. Also, the magnitude of these 
effects is very small, so that only with very high NFA levels they would imply a relevant difference 
for trade balance dynamics. 
                                                                          
27  The coefficient of the lagged NFA position for creditor countries before 1999 is estimated to be 0.521, with a p-value of 
0.000. The coefficient for debtor economies outside the EMU after 1999 is a non-significant -0.062 (p-value 0.185). The 
same coefficient for creditor countries outside the Euro Zone after 1999 is estimated to be 0.339 (p-value 0.000), which 
is significantly lower than the pre-EMU coefficient. The NFA coefficient for creditor countries than joined the Euro zone 
is estimated to be 0.038 for the post-EMU years, which is not significant (p-value 0.595). 
28  The NFA coefficient for creditor countries outside the EMU is 0.532 (p-value 0.000), which is significantly higher than the 
same coefficient for creditor economies that joined the Euro Area (0.068, p-value 0.344). 
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Table 7.2 in the Appendix shows that some of the results derived without fixed effects 
are not robust to their inclusion. Namely, with fixed effect estimation the real exchange rate does 
not seem to appreciate following an increase in net foreign assets. This might be due to the fact 
that the significant positive relationship between exchange rates and net external wealth holds 
only in the very long-run, as predicted by the theory. Fixed effects, capturing long-run 
relationships, might end up capturing that link. According to this interpretation, then, exchange 
rate movements would be stabilizing only in the very long run, as theory would suggest, and not 
in medium to short-run fluctuations. Anyways, results obtained with fixed effects show that, if 
anything, real exchange rate tend to exert a higher stabilizing impact on creditor economies. In 
this sense, they confirm the finding that the lack of stabilization through relative price fluctuations 
is unlikely to be the cause of the asymmetry between the wealth accumulation of creditor and 
debtor economies.   
Overall, these results seem to suggest that the reason for the asymmetric impact of 
stock imbalances on the wealth accumulation of creditor and debtor countries lies more in a 
weak marginal propensity to consume of the formers than in a different response of relative prices 
in the two groups of countries.  
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7  Conclusions  
Global imbalances played an important role in the run-up to the global financial crisis, irrespectively 
of whether they represented a symptom of the global turmoil the global financial crisis or were rather 
among its causes. Traditionally, external imbalances are measured as divergences in countries’ 
current account positions (“flow imbalances”). Still, global imbalances can also be characterized as 
the systematic increase in countries’ net claims and liabilities, as described in their net foreign asset 
positions (“stock imbalances”). While after the crisis flow imbalances have significantly diminished, 
stock imbalances have continued to rise. The aim of this paper is to study some of the implications 
that stock imbalances may have for external stability.  
Our results show a remarkable asymmetry between creditor and debtor economies in 
the impact that stock imbalances have on current account flows. While in debtor countries they 
help –other things equal— to correct future current account deficits, in creditor economies they 
contribute to increase surpluses. These findings hold in spite of the stabilizing impact that net 
foreign assets have in the long run on the trade balance of creditor countries through the real 
exchange rate. Namely, in the case of creditor economies a higher level of net foreign assets 
might correspond to a more appreciated real exchange rate  (which should limit their trade 
surpluses and wealth accumulation) but this equilibrating mechanism seems to be active only in 
the very long run and is not sufficient to limit creditors’ wealth accumulation. 
Overall, the destabilizing impact of stock imbalances on the wealth accumulation of 
creditor economies seems to be due either to a low marginal propensity to consume and import 
of these countries out of net external wealth or to other characteristics that limit the worsening in 
their trade balance in response to an increased expenditure.  
The implications of this result can be very relevant for trade and growth dynamics at the 
global level. In the short run debtor countries remain the most vulnerable to market sentiment 
and financial tensions, which call for a proper correction in their disequilibria, through the 
generation of future surpluses or, at least, the shrinking of the deficits. But creditor countries do 
not seem to react symmetrically to this correction by increasing their demand and imports (which 
ultimately constitute debtor economies’ exports). Therefore, the adjustment will end up reducing 
debtors’ imports and, ultimately, their aggregate demand. This outcome, while effective in limiting 
the risks stemming from excessively negative current account and debtor positions, would likely 
imply a slowdown in both global trade and GDP growth. The reasons underlying the reluctance 
of creditors to adjust by expanding imports and demand go beyond the scope of this paper, but 
clearly deserve further research as they may hamper global growth in the medium run. 
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Appendix 1. The dataset 29 
The dataset consists of 39 countries including both developed and emerging economies. Most 
of them are OECD members (Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Latvia, 
Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, UK and US), but not the rest (China, Cyprus, Croatia, India, 
Lithuania and Romania). 
As it is explained below, the variables used in this empirical paper were taken from very 
different sources. In some cases it was necessary to link different bases for the same time series. 
This was made using the common year as the fixed point, introducing adjustments when it was 
necessary to fulfil accounting identities. In other cases, it was necessary to interpolate some 
missing values from very close proxies. 
Balance of payments and international investment position: There were obtained 
from the IMF BOPs statistics. In most of the cases it was necessary to link the different bases.   
GDP and expected growth: The main source is the IMF WEO database, both in real 
and nominal terms. In some cases, GDP deflators were interpolated from consumer price 
inflation. Domestic output gaps were calculated using the one-side HP filter and trade-partners 
output gaps correspond to export-weighted output gaps with variable weights. 
PPPs and bilateral exchange rates: They were also taken from the IMF WEO 
database. Effective exchange rates are weighted with the export share and, again, weights are 
variable. 
Population: This information was obtained from the UN database, jointly with the long-
term projections and its structure. This information allows us to calculate both the ageing speed 
and the dependency ratio as in the EBA IMF exercise.  
Financial centre, own currency share in world reserves and reserves: These 
variables were taken from the IMF EBA database. They were enlarged to 1980 using information 
from the corresponding IMF annual reports. 
Private sector credit: For most of the countries this variable came from the BIS 
database on credit. For the remaining ones from the World Bank database. 
M2 and private sector deposits: They were taken from the World Bank database. In 
some cases it was necessary to use domestic sources to fulfil data gaps. 
Gini Index: It comes from the Standardized World Income Inequality Database and 
the OECD.   
Financial reforms index: it is taken from Abiad et al. (2008). 
                                                                          
29  The full data set is available upon request. 
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VIX, US short term interest rate and corporate credit spreads:  They come from the 
FRED database. The short term interest rate corresponds to the three-months and the spreads 
to that calculated by Moody’s. 
Gross fixed capital formation deflator: It has been obtained from the OECD database 
and domestic sources.   
Employment: It is taken from the IMF WEO database combined in some cases both 
with the ILO database and domestic sources. 
Openness degree: It is defined as exports plus imports form the balance of payments 
statistics divided on GDP.  
Commodities terms of trade: It was taken from the IMF EBA database and extended 
using a similar definition but considering less categories of commodities. 
Structural public balance: Headline public balance was obtained from the IMF WEO 
data base and domestic sources. Following IMF EBA calculations, the structural component 
corresponds to the residual of a country by country regression of this variable on the output gap. 
Institutional and political environment: It was taken from the WB database on 
governance indicators.    
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Appendix 2. Stylized facts on wealth accumulation – Figures and Tables  
 
 
SOURCE: Own calculations and IMF. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1980-20151980-1984 1985-1989 1990-1994 1995-19992000-2004 2005-2009 2010-2015
NIIP change -14,4 -5,0 1,2 -2,3 -6,5 -0,6 -8,0 5,1
Growth effect 16,0 -4,6 2,0 1,2 3,2 9,6 6,2 -2,5
Cur. & cap. accoun -18,9 -5,9 -3,1 -2,7 -6,0 -3,9 -7,4 6,7
Capital gains -11,9 1,1 -1,1 -2,5 -4,4 -4,2 -5,0 3,9
Other 0,4 4,5 3,4 1,7 0,7 -2,1 -1,7 -3,0
NIIP change 39,9 1,6 -0,1 -0,3 6,0 4,0 7,3 11,4
Growth effect -12,0 0,8 -3,6 -1,9 -0,1 -3,3 -3,0 2,1
Cur. & cap. accoun 43,4 1,0 2,0 1,4 3,6 6,0 6,6 11,9
Capital gains 6,8 -1,3 1,4 0,0 3,0 -0,3 3,3 -1,0
Other 1,8 1,1 0,2 0,2 -0,6 1,7 0,3 -1,7
NIIP change -40,3 -4,3 2,0 -4,1 -7,6 1,6 -10,8 -10,3
Growth effect 24,4 0,2 7,6 2,6 2,8 7,8 4,5 -5,2
Cur. & cap. accoun -26,5 -4,7 -3,5 -2,7 -1,1 -1,0 -6,8 -2,3
Capital gains -23,2 1,1 -2,6 -5,1 -8,0 0,0 -6,6 1,9
Other -14,9 -0,9 0,6 1,0 -1,3 -5,2 -1,9 -4,6
NIIP change -0,9 0,1 0,0 -0,9 -1,0 1,2 1,4 -1,1
Growth effect -7,3 0,0 0,0 -0,5 -0,3 -0,4 -1,6 -1,0
Cur. & cap. accoun 7,8 0,3 0,0 -0,1 -0,8 0,8 2,9 1,1
Capital gains 1,4 -0,2 0,0 1,0 0,2 0,7 -0,2 -0,8
Other -2,8 0,0 0,0 -1,4 -0,1 0,1 0,4 -0,4
NIIP change -31,2 -4,1 -1,1 2,6 -13,2 -11,8 -16,5 12,9
Growth effect 27,4 -9,3 -2,8 2,2 4,1 18,2 15,2 -0,3
Cur. & cap. accoun -69,9 -4,2 -3,0 -4,2 -18,7 -19,0 -21,8 1,0
Capital gains -9,1 2,2 0,1 1,2 -3,5 -11,1 -7,6 9,5
Other 20,4 7,2 4,6 3,4 4,8 0,1 -2,3 2,7
Emerging debtor countries
TABLE 2.1. DECOMPOSITION OF NFA CHANGES, EQ.[2]. Non-weighted average
All countries
Advanced creditor economies
Advanced debtor economies
Emerging creditor countries
Table 2.1. Decomposition of NFA changes,  EQ.[2]. 
Non-weighted average 
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Source: Own calculations and IMF. 
 
  
1980-2015 1980-1984 1985-1989 1990-1994 1995-1999 2000-2004 2005-2009 2010-2015
Current and cap.acc. -28,0 -11,7 -4,6 -3,3 -6,7 -3,8 -7,4 6,7
Trade 4,0 -8,1 0,7 -0,2 -3,0 1,3 -0,5 12,6
Investment income -58,9 -8,2 -10,1 -7,9 -7,4 -8,6 -10,0 -10,0
Other 27,0 4,6 4,8 4,8 3,7 3,5 3,1 4,1
Current and cap.acc. 39,0 -1,7 1,5 0,8 4,0 6,1 6,6 11,9
Trade 42,4 -1,9 2,0 2,0 5,3 6,5 6,7 11,2
Investment income 13,3 0,6 1,0 0,3 0,1 1,3 1,9 4,8
Other -16,7 -0,4 -1,4 -1,6 -1,4 -1,7 -2,1 -4,0
Current and cap.acc. -39,0 -9,8 -5,9 -4,4 -2,3 -1,0 -6,8 -2,3
Trade 3,5 -7,7 -2,6 -0,4 2,1 5,3 0,5 5,6
Investment income -64,6 -7,3 -9,5 -8,6 -7,2 -7,4 -6,6 -7,3
Other 22,1 5,2 6,2 4,7 2,7 1,1 -0,7 -0,7
Current and cap.acc. 7,2 -0,6 0,7 1,1 -1,3 0,8 2,9 1,1
Trade 5,7 0,4 0,9 -0,9 -1,7 0,8 3,1 1,2
Investment income -4,4 -1,1 -0,2 -0,2 -0,2 -0,3 -0,8 -0,2
Other 5,9 0,1 0,0 2,3 0,7 0,3 0,5 0,2
Current and cap.acc. -72,4 -5,9 -3,7 -4,1 -18,9 -19,0 -21,8 1,0
Trade -49,1 -2,2 1,5 -2,4 -18,0 -16,5 -16,2 4,6
Investment income -80,1 -5,8 -7,8 -7,0 -7,7 -12,4 -17,7 -21,7
Other 56,8 2,1 2,6 5,3 6,8 9,8 12,1 18,0
Emerging creditor countries
Emerging debtor countries
TABLE 2.2. DECOMPOSITION OF CUM. CA, EQ. [3]. Non-weighted average
All countries
Advanced creditor economies
Advanced debtor economies
Table 2.2. Decomposition of CUM. CA, EQ.[3]. 
Non-weighted average 
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Figure 2.1. Decomposition of the investment income balance, eq. [5].  
Non-weighted averages. 
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SOURCE: Own calculations and IMF. 
 
 
 
1980-2015 1980-1984 1985-1989 1990-1994 1995-1999 2000-20042005-2009 2010-2015
All countries
Share of equity 0,22 0,16 0,18 0,18 0,21 0,25 0,28 0,31
Share of debt 0,78 0,85 0,83 0,82 0,79 0,75 0,72 0,69
Advanced economies
Share of equity 0,28 0,17 0,20 0,24 0,30 0,34 0,35 0,37
Share of debt 0,72 0,84 0,80 0,76 0,70 0,66 0,65 0,63
Advanced creditor economies
Share of equity 0,25 0,15 0,18 0,21 0,26 0,26 0,28 0,38
Share of debt 0,75 0,85 0,82 0,79 0,74 0,74 0,72 0,62
Advanced debtor economies
Share of equity 0,30 0,18 0,21 0,26 0,31 0,37 0,38 0,37
Share of debt 0,70 0,82 0,79 0,74 0,69 0,63 0,62 0,63
Emerging countries
Share of equity 0,12 0,09 0,10 0,06 0,07 0,09 0,17 0,21
Share of debt 0,88 0,92 0,91 0,94 0,93 0,91 0,83 0,79
Emerging creditor countries
Share of equity 0,05 0,00 . 0,08 0,05 0,00 0,10 0,03
Share of debt 0,95 1,00 . 0,92 0,95 1,00 0,90 0,97
Emerging debtor countries
Share of equity 0,13 0,11 0,09 0,06 0,07 0,10 0,18 0,22
Share of debt 0,87 0,89 0,91 0,94 0,93 0,90 0,82 0,78
TABLE 2.3. PORTFOLIO COMPOSITION: ASSETS. Non-weighted average
Table 2.3. Portfolio composition: assets. 
Non-weighted average 
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SOURCE: Own calculations and IMF. 
1980-2015 1980-1984 1985-1989 1990-1994 1995-1999 2000-20042005-2009 2010-2015
All countries
Share of equity 0,26 0,13 0,14 0,19 0,27 0,32 0,34 0,33
Share of debt 0,74 0,87 0,86 0,81 0,73 0,68 0,66 0,67
Advanced economies
Share of equity 0,24 0,14 0,16 0,20 0,28 0,30 0,31 0,31
Share of debt 0,76 0,86 0,84 0,80 0,72 0,70 0,69 0,69
Advanced creditor economies
Share of equity 0,26 0,16 0,20 0,20 0,28 0,26 0,31 0,36
Share of debt 0,74 0,84 0,80 0,80 0,72 0,74 0,69 0,64
Advanced debtor economies
Share of equity 0,24 0,13 0,14 0,20 0,28 0,32 0,31 0,28
Share of debt 0,76 0,87 0,86 0,80 0,72 0,68 0,69 0,72
Emerging countries
Share of equity 0,28 0,10 0,07 0,17 0,25 0,35 0,39 0,37
Share of debt 0,72 0,92 0,93 0,83 0,75 0,65 0,61 0,63
Emerging creditor countries
Share of equity 0,14 0,01 . 0,18 0,18 0,08 0,19 0,10
Share of debt 0,86 0,99 . 0,82 0,82 0,92 0,81 0,90
Emerging debtor countries
Share of equity 0,30 0,11 0,07 0,15 0,26 0,37 0,41 0,39
Share of debt 0,70 0,89 0,93 0,85 0,74 0,63 0,59 0,61
TABLE 2.4. PORTFOLIO COMPOSITION: LIABILITIES. Non-weighted average
Table 2.4. Portfolio composition: liabilities. 
Non-weighted average 
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Appendix 3. Auxiliary regressions 
Some of the regressors included as controls could be endogenous. Therefore, we estimate the 
equations in the main text by instrumental variables. In order to implement the traditional two-
step procedure, we need to run auxiliary regressions to derive the fitted value of the 
corresponding variables. These regressions for the structural public balance, reserve 
accumulation, credit-to-GDP ratio, labor productivity and total factor productivity appear below.  
The structural component of the fiscal balance depends positively on that at world level, 
it seems to be quite persistent and it is higher in countries with a fixed FX regime, higher ageing 
speed, population growth, when higher is expected growth and in situations of global financial 
stress. On the contrary, it is lower when the oil balance is in surplus and the economy is in 
expansion. These two last outcomes probably reflect the difficulties in properly correcting 
observed balances from temporary business cycle fluctuations. 
In the case of reserve accumulation, following the EBA results, we have run the 
regressions country by country, although using the same explanatory variables. As an average, 
reserve accumulation is higher when other countries do the same, when the FX regime is fixed, 
when there are financial turbulences at the global level and when countries have positive terms 
of trade shocks. It is lower when higher is the financial liberalization degree, when higher are the 
interest rates, and when the structural public balance is showing a surplus.   
Finally, the explanatory factors of labor and total factor productivity are basically the 
same. They are positively correlated with the level of human capital and the output gap, and 
negatively with the relative price of investment in equipment goods. 
Table 3.1. Auxiliary regressions 
 Struc. fiscal 
balance 
Res. 
acc.** 
Credit-to-GDP  
ratio 
Labor  
productivity 
Total factor  
productivity 
 RE 
(1) 
FE 
(2) 
 
(3) 
RE 
(4) 
FE 
(5) 
RE 
(8) 
FE 
(9) 
RE 
(10) 
FE 
(11) 
Cnte. 
-0.014 
(0.009) 
-0.047 
(0.010) 
0.048 
-0.288 
(0.086) 
-0.505 
(0.010) 
-5.220 
(0.863) 
-9.187 
(0.573) 
-6.125 
(1.140) 
-9.815 
(0.432) 
World aver. dep. 
var.  (L) 
0.550 
(0.134) 
0.608 
(0.144) 
0.710 - - - - - - 
Country aver. 
dep. var.  
0.983 
(0.023) 
- - 
0.933 
(0.022) 
- 
0.389 
(0.104) 
- 
0.396 
(0.146) 
- 
Relative 
investment 
deflator (L) 
- - - - - 
-0.436 
(0.164) 
-0.161 
(0.131) 
-0.320 
(0.130) 
-0.150 
(0.110) 
Human capital - - - - - 
3.163 
(0.511) 
5.610 
(0.533) 
2.731 
(0.408) 
4.111 
(0.386) 
FX regime: 
strong peg 
0.008 
(0.003) 
0.015 
(0.006) 
0.005 
0.113 
(0.048) 
0.198 
(0.087) 
- - - - 
FX regime: weak 
peg 
0.001 
(0.003) 
0.002 
(0.004) 
0.003 
0.046 
(0.039) 
0.060 
(0.053) 
- - - - 
Expected growth 
(L) 
0.411 
(0.066) 
0.414 
(0.068) 
- - - - - - - 
Output gap (L) 
-0.201 
(0.045) 
-0.211 
(0.046) 
- 
1.904 
(0.594) 
1.807 
(0.636) 
- - - - 
Aging speed 
0.052 
(0.021) 
0.060 
(0.028) 
- 
1.301 
(0.383) 
1.992 
(0.483) 
- - - - 
Population 
growth 
0.505 
(0.149) 
0.656 
(0.428) 
- 
6.789 
(1.843) 
5.915 
(4.278) 
- - - - 
VIX (L) 
0.001 
(0.000) 
0.001 
(0.000) 
0.001 - - - - - - 
Oil external 
balance (L) 
-0.010 
(0.003) 
-0.014 
(0.003) 
- - - - - - - 
Financial liberal. 
(L) - - -0.048 
0.184 
(0.084) 
0.238 
(0.164) 
- - - - 
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US interest rate - - -0.047 
-3.193 
(0.560) 
-1.881 
(0.492) 
- - - - 
US corp. spread - -  
7.648 
(3.811) 
7.989 
(3.494) 
- - - - 
ToT raw 
materials - - 0.426 - - - - - - 
Fitted credit-to-
GDP ratio  - - - - - - - - - 
Fitted output gap  - - - - - 
1.706 
(0.359) 
1.043 
(0.253) 
1.586 
(0.261) 
1.181 
(0.234) 
Real eff. exch. 
rate (L)  - - - - - - - - - 
Gini index (D) - - - - - - - - - 
Fitted struc. 
fiscal balance  - - -0.097 - - - - - - 
Real exchange 
rate (L) - - - - - - - - - 
Raw materials 
ToT - - - - - - - - - 
Raw materials 
ToT (L) - - - - - - - - - 
Obs. 1279 1279 1279 1311 1311 1240 1240 1240 1240 
R2 0.4259 0.0716 0.3394 0.8543 0.2589 0.6851 0.1240 0.6936 0.5266 
Std. Dev. 0.0288 0.0288 - 0.2472 0.2472 0.1662 0.1662 0.1352 0.1353 
Between brackets: standard deviation; L: lagged variable; D: first differences; * First differences of the corresponding variable; 
**Country-by-country regression, the parameters in the table represent the countries’ average. 
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Appendix 4. Detailed external balance regressions 
Table 4.1. Current account regressions with fixed effects 
 Without 
EER 
(1) 
Basic 
specif 
(2) 
Diff. btw. creditors 
& debtors 
(3) 
Valuation  
effects 
(4) 
Cyclical 
shocks 
(5) 
Cyclical shocks  
(exp. vs rec.) 
(6) 
Cyclical shocks 
w/o non-linearities 
(7) 
Cnte. -0.038*** 
(0.007) 
-0.047*** 
(0.008) 
-0.049*** 
(0.008) 
-0.048*** 
(0.008) 
-0.049*** 
(0.008) 
-0.052*** 
(0.008) 
-0.050*** 
(0.008) 
Net foreign assets (L) 0.001 
(0.005) 
0.003 
(0.006) 
-0.019** 
(0.008) 
- 
-0.019** 
(0.008) 
-0.032*** 
(0.008) 
-0.023*** 
(0.007) 
Net foreign assets  creditor 
counties (L) - - 
0.062*** 
(0.014) 
- 
0.062*** 
(0.014) 
0.078*** 
(0.015) 
0.067*** 
(0.014) 
Net foreign assets below  
-80% (L)  - - 
0.012** 
(0.005) 
0.012** 
(0.005) 
0.012** 
(0.005) 
0.010** 
(0.005) 
- 
Net foreign assets. CA 
accumulation (L) - - - 
-0.017* 
(0.010) 
- - - 
Net foreign assets. Valuation 
effects (L) - - - 
-0.023** 
(0.009) 
- - - 
Net foreign assets creditor 
countries. CA accumulation (L) - - - 
0.065*** 
(0.014) 
- - - 
Net foreign assets creditor 
countries. Valuation effects (L) - - - 
0.049*** 
(0.017) 
- - - 
Net foreign assets *output gap (L) - - - - 
0.108 
(0.100) 
0.596*** 
(0.157) 
0.597*** 
(0.158) 
Net foreign assets * negative 
output gap (L) - - - - - 
-0.792*** 
(0.210) 
-0.836*** 
(0.210) 
Net foreign assets creditor 
countries * output gap (L) - - - - - 
-1.398** 
(0.593) 
-1.381** 
(0.593) 
Net foreign assets creditor 
countries * negative output  
gap (L) 
- - - - - 
1.603* 
(0.886) 
1.646* 
(0.886) 
Real effective trade weighted 
exchange rate (L) - 
0.007 
(0.008) 
0.008 
(0.007) 
0.008 
(0.007) 
0.008 
(0.008) 
0.003 
(0.007) 
0.003 
(0.007) 
Nom. eff. FX financial (DL) - 
-0.011* 
(0.006) 
-0.010* 
(0.006) 
-0.010* 
(0.006) 
-0.011* 
(0.006) 
-0.010* 
(0.006) 
-0.010* 
(0.006) 
Financial centre -0.004 
(0.012) 
0.014 
(0.012) 
0.017 
(0.012) 
0.016 
(0.012) 
0.017 
(0.012) 
0.018 
(0.012) 
0.018 
(0.012) 
Relative TFP (L) 0.015* 
(0.009) 
0.054*** 
(0.009) 
0.051*** 
(0.008) 
0.049*** 
(0.009) 
0.051*** 
(0.008) 
0.048*** 
(0.008) 
0.048*** 
(0.008) 
Relative TFP * K openness (L) 0.043*** 
(0.011) 
0.034*** 
(0.012) 
0.031*** 
(0.011) 
0.031*** 
(0.011) 
0.030*** 
(0.011) 
0.031*** 
(0.011) 
0.032*** 
(0.011) 
Relative energy balance (oil 
exporters) 
1.157*** 
(0.152) 
1.177*** 
(0.151) 
1.196*** 
(0.144) 
1.197*** 
(0.142) 
1.192*** 
(0.142) 
1.214*** 
(0.142) 
1.196*** 
(0.142) 
Relative population growth -0.521* 
(0.291) 
-0.078 
(0.371) 
-0.147 
(0.368) 
-0.206 
(0.368) 
-0.145 
(0.364) 
-0.074 
(0.361) 
-0.046 
(0.362) 
Relative aging 0.139*** 
(0.043) 
0.141*** 
(0.043) 
0.160*** 
(0.041) 
0.148*** 
(0.041) 
0.160*** 
(0.041) 
0.152*** 
(0.040) 
0.149*** 
(0.040) 
Health expenditure over 
GDP (L) 
-0.291* 
(0.171) 
-0.280* 
(0.169) 
-0.459*** 
(0.167) 
-0.496*** 
(0.172) 
-0.457*** 
(0.167) 
-0.451*** 
(0.165) 
-0.442*** 
(0.165) 
Relative output growth -0.042 
(0.053) 
-0.014 
(0.052) 
-0.014 
(0.051) 
-0.016 
(0.051) 
-0.017 
(0.051) 
-0.013 
(0.051) 
-0.010 
(0.051) 
VIX * capital openness (L) 0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000* 
(0.000) 
0.000* 
(0.000) 
0.000** 
(0.000) 
0.000* 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000* 
(0.000) 
Relative output gap -0.367*** 
(0.060) 
-0.459*** 
(0.061) 
-0.466*** 
(0.059) 
-0.464*** 
(0.059) 
-0.418*** 
(0.068) 
-0.361*** 
(0.072) 
-0.367*** 
(0.072) 
Commodity ToTgap * trade 
openness 
0.140*** 
(0.042) 
0.125*** 
(0.040) 
0.119*** 
(0.040) 
0.118*** 
(0.040) 
0.121*** 
(0.040) 
0.113*** 
(0.040) 
0.119*** 
(0.040) 
Relative structural public balance (I) 0.287 
(0.207) 
0.234 
(0.206) 
0.211 
(0.203) 
0.222 
(0.203) 
0.207 
(0.203) 
0.175 
(0.199) 
0.165 
(0.200) 
Relative reserve 
accumulation*capital controls 
0.381*** 
(0.089) 
0.324*** 
(0.087) 
0.322*** 
(0.088) 
0.324*** 
(0.088) 
0.321*** 
(0.088) 
0.302*** 
(0.087) 
0.305*** 
(0.088) 
Obs. 1261 1164 1164 1164 1164 1164 1164 
R2 0.6259 0.6591 0.6759 0.6796 0.6769 0.6852 0.6865 
Between brackets: standard deviation; L: lagged variable; D: first differences; I: Instrumented; *, **, *** p-value below 10%, 5% and 
1%, respectively. 
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Table 4.2. Current account regressions without fixed effects 
 
Without 
EER 
(1) 
Basic 
specif. 
(2) 
Diff. btw. 
creditors 
& debtors 
(3) 
Valuation 
effects 
(4) 
Temporary 
shocks 
(5) 
Temporary 
shocks  
(exp. vs rec.) 
(6) 
Temporary 
shocks w/o 
non-linearities 
(7) 
Cnte. -0.015*** 
(0.003) 
-0.008** 
(0.003) 
-0.012*** 
(0.003) 
-0.009*** 
(0.003) 
-0.012*** 
(0.003) 
-0.014*** 
(0.003) 
-0.012*** 
(0.003) 
Net foreign assets  (L) 0.010* 
(0.005) 
0.013** 
(0.005) 
-0.003 
(0.008) 
- 
-0.003 
(0.008) 
-0.014* 
(0.008) 
-0.010 
(0.007) 
Net foreign assets  
creditor counties (L) - - 
0.041*** 
(0.014) 
- 
0.041*** 
(0.014) 
0.056*** 
(0.014) 
0.052*** 
(0.014) 
Net foreign assets below 
-80% (L)  - - 
0.008 
(0.005) 
0.009* 
(0.005) 
0.008 
(0.005) 
0.006 
(0.005) 
- 
Net foreign assets. CA 
accumulation (L) - - - 
0.016** 
(0.008) 
- - - 
Net foreign assets. 
Valuation effects (L) - - - 
-0.031*** 
(0.009) 
- - - 
Net foreign assets 
creditor countries. CA 
accumulation (L) 
- - - 
0.037*** 
(0.013) 
- - - 
Net foreign assets 
creditor countries. 
Valuation effects (L) 
- - - 
0.034** 
(0.016) 
- - - 
Net foreign assets * 
output gap (L) - - - - 
0.079 
(0.105) 
0.552*** 
(0.164) 
0.544*** 
(0.163) 
Net foreign assets * 
negative output gap (L) - - - - - 
-0.792*** 
(0.214) 
-0.808*** 
(0.212) 
Net foreign assets 
creditor countries * 
output gap (L) 
- - - - - 
-1.148* 
(0.594) 
-1.122* 
(0.595) 
Net foreign assets 
creditor countries * 
negative output gap (L) 
- - - - - 
1.331 
(0.874) 
1.349 
(0.876) 
Real effective trade  
weighted exchange rate (I) - 
0.013* 
(0.007) 
0.015** 
(0.007) 
0.011* 
(0.006) 
0.011 
(0.007) 
0.013* 
(0.007) 
0.013* 
(0.007) 
Nom. eff. FX financial (DL) - 
-0.011** 
(0.006) 
-0.011* 
(0.006) 
-0.012** 
(0.006) 
-0.011** 
(0.006) 
-0.011** 
(0.006) 
-0.010* 
(0.006) 
Financial centre 0.018** 
(0.008) 
0.028*** 
(0.008) 
0.022*** 
(0.008) 
0.015** 
(0.007) 
0.022*** 
(0.008) 
0.023*** 
(0.008) 
0.025*** 
(0.008) 
Relative TFP (L) -0.015* 
(0.008) 
0.001 
(0.008) 
-0.002 
(0.008) 
0.001 
(0.007) 
-0.002 
(0.008) 
-0.004* 
(0.007) 
-0.003 
(0.007) 
Relative TFP * K 
openness (L) 
0.045*** 
(0.011) 
0.019* 
(0.010) 
0.019* 
(0.010) 
0.014 
(0.009) 
0.018* 
(0.010) 
0.020** 
(0.010) 
0.019* 
(0.010) 
Relative energy balance 
(oil exporters) 
0.971*** 
(0.096) 
0.949*** 
(0.095) 
0.917*** 
(0.095) 
0.812*** 
(0.092) 
0.917*** 
(0.094) 
0.912*** 
(0.094) 
0.880*** 
(0.095) 
Relative population 
growth 
-0.085 
(0.246) 
0.326 
(0.309) 
0.305 
(0.305) 
0.349 
(0.294) 
0.302 
(0.304) 
0.293 
(0.293) 
0.316 
(0.306) 
Relative aging 0.107*** 
(0.040) 
0.115*** 
(0.039) 
0.128*** 
(0.038) 
0.108*** 
(0.035) 
0.128*** 
(0.038) 
0.126*** 
(0.037) 
0.149*** 
(0.362) 
Health expenditure over 
GDP (L) 
0.025 
(0.142) 
-0.165 
(0.146) 
-0.170 
(0.145) 
-0.175 
(0.136) 
-0.174 
(0.145) 
-0.134 
(0.141) 
-0.135 
(0.146) 
Relative output growth -0.038 
(0.044) 
-0.041 
(0.043) 
-0.037 
(0.042) 
-0.007 
(0.042) 
-0.039 
(0.042) 
-0.039 
(0.042) 
-0.006 
(0.050) 
VIX * capital openness (L) 0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000* 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
Relative output gap -0.345*** 
(0.054) 
-0.410*** 
(0.055) 
-0.417*** 
(0.054) 
-0.465*** 
(0.054) 
-0.381*** 
(0.063) 
-0.329*** 
(0.068) 
-0.366*** 
(0.075) 
Commodity ToTgap * 
trade openness 
0.156*** 
(0.039) 
0.146*** 
(0.039) 
0.147*** 
(0.039) 
0.152*** 
(0.039) 
0.148*** 
(0.039) 
0.142*** 
(0.039) 
0.149*** 
(0.039) 
Relative structural public 
balance (I) 
0.273** 
(0.113) 
0.249** 
(0.105) 
0.225** 
(0.103) 
0.111 
(0.096) 
0.225** 
(0.104) 
0.241** 
(0.101) 
0.089 
(0.193) 
Relative reserve 
accumulation*capital 
controls 
0.352*** 
(0.087) 
0.349*** 
(0.087) 
0.339*** 
(0.087) 
0.347*** 
(0.088) 
0.338*** 
(0.087) 
0.320*** 
(0.086) 
0.323*** 
(0.087) 
Obs. 1261 1164 1164 1164 1164 1164 1164 
R2 0.3587 0.4283 0.4315 0.5233 0.4322 0.4437 0.4351 
See previous tables. 
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Table 4.3. Investment income balance regressions with fixed effects 
 Without 
exchange rate 
(1) 
Basic  
spec. 
(2) 
Diff. btw. cred. 
& deb. 
(3) 
Diff. btw. cred. & deb. 
w/non-linearities 
(4) 
Valuation  
effects 
(5) 
Cnte. -0.005* 
(0.003) 
-0.007** 
(0.003) 
-0.007** 
(0.003) 
-0.007** 
(0.003) 
-0.005 
(0.003) 
Net foreign assets (L) 0.025*** 
(0.003) 
0.026*** 
(0.003) 
0.026*** 
(0.004) 
0.024*** 
(0.004) 
- 
Net foreign assets  creditor 
counties (L) - - 
-0.001 
(0.009) 
0.001 
(0.009) 
- 
Net foreign assets below -
80% (L)  - - - 
0.002 
(0.003) 
- 
Weight of equity instr. in ext. 
assets (L) 
0.014* 
(0.007) 
0.013* 
(0.007) 
0.013* 
(0.007) 
0.013* 
(0.007) 
0.011 
(0.007) 
Net foreign assets. CA 
accumulation (L) - - - - 
0.030*** 
(0.004) 
Net foreign assets. Valuation 
effects (L) - - - - 
0.022*** 
(0.005) 
Net foreign assets creditor 
countries. CA accumulation (L) - - - - 
0.001 
(0.008) 
Net foreign assets creditor 
countries. Valuation effects (L) - - - - 
-0.011 
(0.012) 
Nom. eff. FX financial 
weights asset side (LD) - 
-0.004 
(0.005) 
-0.004 
(0.005) 
-0.004 
(0.005) 
-0.004 
(0.005) 
Nom. eff. FX financial 
weights liabilities side (LD) - 
0.010 
(0.007) 
0.010 
(0.007) 
0.011 
(0.007) 
-0.010 
(0.007) 
Relative financial depth 0.008* 
(0.005) 
0.007 
(0.005) 
0.007 
(0.005) 
0.008 
(0.005) 
0.007 
(0.005) 
Relative TFP (L) -0.015*** 
(0.003) 
-0.008** 
(0.004) 
-0.008** 
(0.004) 
-0.008** 
(0.004) 
-0.010*** 
(0.003) 
Relative TFP * K openness (L) 0.004 
(0.006) 
0.001 
(0.006) 
0.001 
(0.006) 
0.001 
(0.006) 
0.000 
(0.006) 
Relative population growth -0.120 
(0.119) 
-0.083 
(0.175) 
-0.082 
(0.175) 
-0.088 
(0.175) 
-0.126 
(0.175) 
VIX * capital openness (L) 0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
Own currency weight in 
world reserves 
-0.003 
(0.011) 
-0.007 
(0.011) 
-0.007 
(0.011) 
-0.008 
(0.011) 
-0.007 
(0.011) 
VIX * own currency weight in 
world reserves (L) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
Relative output gap -0.031 
(0.020) 
-0.047** 
(0.023) 
-0.047** 
(0.023) 
-0.048** 
(0.022) 
-0.049** 
(0.023) 
Relative credit to GDP ratio (I) -0.006 
(0.005) 
-0.010** 
(0.005) 
-0.010** 
(0.005) 
-0.010** 
(0.005) 
-0.011** 
(0.005) 
Relative output growth 0.004 
(0.016) 
-0.003 
(0.018) 
-0.003 
(0.018) 
-0.004 
(0.018) 
-0.003 
(0.018) 
Obs. 1261 1164 1164 1164 1164 
R2 0.8042 0.8264 0.8264 0.8268 0.8303 
See previous tables. 
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Table 4.4. Investment income balance regressions without fixed effects 
 Without 
exchange rate 
(1) 
Basic  
spec. 
(2) 
Diff. btw. cred. 
& deb. 
(3) 
Diff. btw. cred. & deb. 
w/non-linearities 
(4) 
Valuation 
effects 
(5) 
Cnte. -0.016*** 
(0.002) 
-0.016*** 
(0.003) 
-0.016*** 
(0.003) 
-0.016*** 
(0.003) 
-0.015*** 
(0.003) 
Net foreign assets  (L) 
0.036*** 
(0.003) 
0.039*** 
(0.004) 
0.041*** 
(0.004) 
0.043*** 
(0.005) 
- 
Net foreign assets  creditor 
counties (L) - - 
-0.002 
(0.010) 
-0.004 
(0.011) 
- 
Net foreign assets  
below -80% (L)  - - - 
0.002 
(0.003) 
- 
Weight of equity instr. 
in ext. assets (L) 
0.010* 
(0.005) 
0.010* 
(0.006) 
0.011* 
(0.006) 
0.011* 
(0.006) 
0.007 
(0.006) 
Net foreign assets. CA 
accumulation (L) - - - - 
0.045*** 
(0.004) 
Net foreign assets.  
Valuation effects (L) - - - - 
0.034*** 
(0.006) 
Net foreign assets creditor 
countries. CA accumulation (L) - - - - 
0.000 
(0.010) 
Net foreign assets creditor 
countries. Valuation effects (L) - - - - 
-0.020 
(0.015) 
Nom. eff. FX financial weights 
asset side (LD) - 
-0.010* 
(0.005) 
-0.010* 
(0.005) 
-0.010* 
(0.005) 
-0.010** 
(0.005) 
Nom. eff. FX financial weights 
liabilities side (LD) - 
-0.016** 
(0.007) 
0.016** 
(0.008) 
0.016** 
(0.008) 
0.016** 
(0.008) 
Relative financial depth 0.014*** 
(0.003) 
0.015*** 
(0.004) 
0.015*** 
(0.003) 
0.015*** 
(0.003) 
0.012*** 
(0.003) 
Relative TFP (L) -0.017*** 
(0.003) 
-0.015*** 
(0.003) 
-0.016*** 
(0.003) 
-0.016*** 
(0.003) 
-0.014*** 
(0.003) 
Relative TFP * K openness (L) 0.029*** 
(0.005) 
0.026*** 
(0.006) 
0.026*** 
(0.006) 
0.026*** 
(0.006) 
0.025*** 
(0.006) 
Relative population growth -0.198* 
(0.110) 
-0.290* 
(0.158) 
-0.315** 
(0.155) 
-0.311** 
(0.156) 
-0.279* 
(0.157) 
VIX * capital openness (L) 0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
Own currency weight in world 
reserves 
0.003 
(0.008) 
0.003 
(0.009) 
0.003 
(0.009) 
0.003 
(0.009) 
0.004 
(0.008) 
VIX * own currency weight in 
world reserves (L) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
Relative output gap -0.051** 
(0.023) 
-0.057** 
(0.027) 
-0.057** 
(0.027) 
-0.056** 
(0.027) 
-0.061** 
(0.027) 
Relative credit to GDP ratio (I) -0.004 
(0.004) 
-0.005 
(0.004) 
-0.006 
(0.004) 
-0.006 
(0.004) 
-0.005 
(0.004) 
Relative output growth 0.013 
(0.018) 
0.002 
(0.020) 
0.001 
(0.020) 
0.001 
(0.020) 
0.003 
(0.020) 
Obs. 1261 1164 1164 1164 1164 
R2 0.4605 0.4787 0.4822 0.4830 0.4912 
See previous tables. 
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Table 4.5. Trade balance regressions with fixed effects 
 
 
Without  
EER 
(1) 
Basic 
specif. 
(2) 
Diff. btw. 
creditors & 
debtors 
(3) 
Valuation 
effects 
(4) 
Temporary 
shocks 
(5) 
Temporary 
shocks  
(exp. vs rec.) 
(6) 
Temporary 
shocks w/o 
non-linearities 
(7) 
Cnte. -0.043*** 
(0.007) 
-0.047*** 
(0.007) 
-0.048*** 
(0.007) 
-0.047*** 
(0.007) 
-0.044*** 
(0.007) 
-0.046*** 
(0.008) 
-0.045*** 
(0.008) 
Net foreign assets (L) -0.016*** 
(0.006) 
-0.015*** 
(0.006) 
-0.035*** 
(0.008) 
- 
-0.035*** 
(0.008) 
-0.043*** 
(0.008) 
-0.038*** 
(0.007) 
Net foreign assets   
creditor counties (L) - - 
0.065*** 
(0.015) 
- 
0.066*** 
(0.015) 
0.073*** 
(0.015) 
0.066*** 
(0.014) 
Net foreign assets  
below -80% (L)  - - 
0.006 
(0.005) 
0.006 
(0.005) 
0.008 
(0.005) 
0.006 
(0.005) 
- 
Net foreign assets.  
CA accumulation (L) - - - 
-0.034*** 
(0.009) 
- - - 
Net foreign assets. 
Valuation effects (L) - - - 
-0.034*** 
(0.010) 
- - - 
Net foreign assets  
creditor countries.  
CA accumulation (L) 
- - - 
0.071*** 
(0.015) 
- - - 
Net foreign assets creditor 
countries. Valuation effects (L) - - - 
0.050*** 
(0.019) 
- - - 
Net foreign assets *  
output gap (L) - - - - 
0.084 
(0.106) 
0.754*** 
(0.197) 
0.767 
(0.197) 
Net foreign assets * 
negative output gap (L) - - - - - 
-1.071*** 
(0.288) 
-1.106*** 
(0.287) 
Net foreign assets creditor 
countries * output gap (L) - - - - - 
-0.640 
(0.464) 
-0.652 
(0.463) 
Net foreign assets creditor 
countries * negative output 
gap (L) 
- - - - - 
0.847 
(0.665) 
0.881 
(0.662) 
Real effective trade 
weighted exchange rate (L) - 
-0.009 
(0.006) 
-0.007 
(0.006) 
-0.007 
(0.006) 
0.002 
(0.006) 
0.001 
(0.006) 
0.001 
(0.006) 
Relative TFP (L) 0.024*** 
(0.008) 
0.027*** 
(0.008) 
0.026*** 
(0.008) 
0.025*** 
(0.008) 
0.028*** 
(0.008) 
0.027*** 
(0.008) 
0.027*** 
(0.008) 
Relative TFP * K openness (L) 0.048*** 
(0.010) 
0.051*** 
(0.011) 
0.047*** 
(0.011) 
0.048*** 
(0.011) 
0.039*** 
(0.011) 
0.042*** 
(0.011) 
0.042*** 
(0.011) 
Relative energy balance 
(oil exporters) 
1.100*** 
(0.121) 
1.094*** 
(0.122) 
1.089*** 
(0.125) 
1.080*** 
(0.125) 
1.145*** 
(0.126) 
1.173*** 
(0.125) 
1.165*** 
(0.125) 
Relative dependency ratio -0.002 
(0.053) 
0.007 
(0.053) 
-0.036 
(0.053) 
-0.052 
(0.053) 
-0.008 
(0.056) 
-0.018 
(0.052) 
-0.016 
(0.052) 
Relative population growth -0.415 
(0.267) 
-0.384 
(0.268) 
-0.374 
(0.264) 
-0.403 
(0.265) 
-0.130 
(0.256) 
-0.188 
(0.251) 
-0.176 
(0.251) 
Relative aging 0.166*** 
(0.049) 
0.170*** 
(0.049) 
0.174*** 
(0.048) 
0.158*** 
(0.049) 
0.180*** 
(0.048) 
0.165*** 
(0.048) 
0.164*** 
(0.048) 
Health expenditure over 
GDP (L) 
-0.448*** 
(0.171) 
-0.451*** 
(0.171) 
-0.567*** 
(0.170) 
-0.601*** 
(0.173) 
-0.573*** 
(0.163) 
-0.540*** 
(0.161) 
-0.535*** 
(0.162) 
Relative output growth -0.109** 
(0.052) 
-0.107** 
(0.051) 
-0.104** 
(0.051) 
-0.106** 
(0.051) 
-0.094* 
(0.051) 
-0.102*** 
(0.051) 
-0.100** 
(0.051) 
Relative output gap -0.272*** 
(0.060) 
-0.270*** 
(0.060) 
-0.275*** 
(0.059) 
-0.271*** 
(0.060) 
-0.272*** 
(0.061) 
-0.241*** 
(0.062) 
-0.240*** 
(0.061) 
Commodity ToTgap * 
trade openness 
0.179*** 
(0.040) 
0.181*** 
(0.040) 
0.182*** 
(0.041) 
0.182*** 
(0.040) 
0.173*** 
(0.039) 
0.157*** 
(0.039) 
0.160*** 
(0.039) 
Relative structural public 
balance (I) 
0.465** 
(0.201) 
0.453** 
(0.201) 
0.413** 
(0.199) 
0.426** 
(0.198) 
0.406** 
(0.194) 
0.435** 
(0.191) 
0.425** 
(0.191) 
Obs. 1261 1261 1261 1261 1228 1228 1228 
R2 0.7205 0.7204 0.7341 0.7355 0.7594 0.7621 0.7631 
See previous tables. 
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Table 4.6. Trade balance regressions without fixed effects 
 
 
Without 
EER 
 (1) 
Basic 
specif. 
 (2) 
Diff. btw. 
creditors & 
debtors 
(3) 
Valuation 
effects 
(4) 
Temporary 
shocks 
 (5) 
Temporary 
shocks 
(exp. vs rec.) 
(6) 
Temporary 
shocks w/o 
non-linearities 
(7) 
Cnte. -0.008** 
(0.003) 
-0.006* 
(0.003) 
-0.012*** 
(0.004) 
-0.009** 
(0.003) 
-0.008** 
(0.004) 
-0.009*** 
(0.004) 
-0.008** 
(0.004) 
Net foreign assets (L) -0.008 
(0.005) 
-0.009* 
(0.006) 
-0.030*** 
(0.009) 
- 
-0.029*** 
(0.009) 
-0.037*** 
(0.009) 
-0.032*** 
(0.008) 
Net foreign assets  
creditor counties (L) - - 
0.059*** 
(0.015) 
- 
0.058*** 
(0.015) 
0.066*** 
(0.015) 
0.059*** 
(0.014) 
Net foreign assets below 
-80% (L)  - - 
0.007 
(0.005) 
0.007 
(0.005) 
0.008 
(0.005) 
0.006 
(0.005) 
- 
Net foreign assets.  
CA accumulation (L) - - - 
-0.014 
(0.009) 
- - - 
Net foreign assets. 
Valuation effects (L) - - - 
-0.047*** 
(0.011) 
- - - 
Net foreign assets 
creditor countries.  
CA accumulation (L) 
- - - 
0.055*** 
(0.014) 
- - - 
Net foreign assets 
creditor countries. 
Valuation effects (L) 
- - - 
0.048** 
(0.019) 
- - - 
Net foreign assets * 
output gap (L) - - - - 
0.113 
(0.109) 
0.785*** 
(0.208) 
0.794*** 
(0.206) 
Net foreign assets * 
negative output gap (L) - - - - - 
-1.089*** 
(0.301) 
-1.123*** 
(0.298) 
Net foreign assets 
creditor countries * 
output gap (L) 
- - - - - 
-0.605 
(0.452) 
-0.616 
(0.448) 
Net foreign assets 
creditor countries * 
negative output gap (L) 
- - - - - 
0.900 
(0.630) 
0.935 
(0.623) 
Real effective trade 
weighted exchange rate (L) - 
0.008 
(0.006) 
0.011* 
(0.006) 
0.012* 
(0.006) 
0.019*** 
(0.006) 
0.017*** 
(0.006) 
0.017*** 
(0.006) 
Relative TFP (L) -0.001 
(0.008) 
-0.005 
(0.008) 
-0.006 
(0.008) 
-0.002 
(0.007) 
-0.003 
(0.008) 
-0.004 
(0.008) 
-0.003 
(0.008) 
Relative TFP * K 
openness (L) 
0.043*** 
(0.011) 
0.042*** 
(0.011) 
0.037*** 
(0.011) 
0.029*** 
(0.010) 
0.029*** 
(0.011) 
0.031*** 
(0.011) 
0.031*** 
(0.011) 
Relative energy balance 
(oil exporters) 
1.059*** 
(0.086) 
1.052*** 
(0.086) 
1.005*** 
(0.091) 
0.926*** 
(0.088) 
0.980*** 
(0.091) 
1.001*** 
(0.091) 
1.006*** 
(0.092) 
Relative dependency 
ratio 
-0.144*** 
(0.048) 
-0.146*** 
(0.048) 
-0.168*** 
(0.048) 
-0.188*** 
(0.044) 
-0.168*** 
(0.046) 
-0.170*** 
(0.045) 
-0.166*** 
(0.046) 
Relative population 
growth 
-0.257 
(0.238) 
-0.315 
(0.237) 
-0.331 
(0.234) 
-0.273 
(0.238) 
-0.147 
(0.231) 
-0.201 
(0.227) 
-0.203 
(0.228) 
Relative aging 0.020 
(0.047) 
0.017 
(0.047) 
0.035 
(0.046) 
0.008 
(0.042) 
0.032 
(0.045) 
0.027 
(0.045) 
0.025 
(0.045) 
Health expenditure over 
GDP (L) 
0.309* 
(0.171) 
0.287* 
(0.172) 
0.329* 
(0.169) 
0.379** 
(0.162) 
0.296* 
(0.163) 
0.316* 
(0.162) 
0.299* 
(0.163) 
Relative output growth -0.145*** 
(0.041) 
-0.145*** 
(0.041) 
-0.142*** 
(0.041) 
-0.117*** 
(0.041) 
-0.131*** 
(0.041) 
-0.135*** 
(0.041) 
-0.135*** 
(0.042) 
Relative output gap -0.187*** 
(0.051) 
-0.189*** 
(0.051) 
-0.194*** 
(0.051) 
-0.225*** 
(0.052) 
-0.194*** 
(0.053) 
-0.168*** 
(0.054) 
-0.166*** 
(0.054) 
Commodity ToTgap * 
trade openness 
0.191*** 
(0.038) 
0.192*** 
(0.038) 
0.197*** 
(0.039) 
0.204*** 
(0.040) 
0.197*** 
(0.038) 
0.182*** 
(0.038) 
0.183*** 
(0.038) 
Relative structural public 
balance (I) 
0.596*** 
(0.122) 
0.595*** 
(0.123) 
0.551*** 
(0.120) 
0.475*** 
(0.112) 
0.520*** 
(0.116) 
0.542*** 
(0.115) 
0.544*** 
(0.118) 
Obs. 1261 1261 1261 1261 1228 1228 1228 
R2 0.3013 0.3149 0.3381 0.4100 0.3617 0.3689 0.3715 
See previous tables. 
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Appendix 5. Residual balance regressions 
The residual balance of the current account includes items determined by both the private and 
the public sector or which depend on various agreements between countries. For example, this 
sub-balance includes migrants’ remittances, which usually flow from richer countries (net 
immigration) to poorer countries (net emigration). In this sense, his behavior might resemble that 
of the trade balance, becoming negative in the expansion phase of the cycle and positive in the 
recession. But it also includes the effect of multilateral mechanisms such as those that exist in 
the European Union, by which member countries emit transfers depending on VAT collection 
and receive them according, especially, to their level of per capita income. In general, this type 
of items should also flow from richer to poorer countries and fluctuate counter-cyclically. Since 
both countries with higher and lower per capita income may be creditors and debtors, it seems 
that the sign of net external assets in this regression is not defined a priori. 
As shown in the first column of Table 5.1, the coefficient of net foreign assets is negative 
and significant, implying a stabilizing impact of stock imbalances on wealth accumulation through 
this sub-balance. The real effective exchange rate has also a positive effect, which may result 
from decisions of migrants. However, no asymmetry between creditors and debtors is observed 
(column 2 and 3). Capital gains derived from net external assets not appear to have a significant 
effect (column 4). Results are confirmed in regressions without fixed effects (Table 5.2). In this 
case, however, net foreign assets are estimated to exert an even higher stabilizing impact on 
creditor residual balance than on debtors’, although the coefficient interacted with the creditor 
dummy is only marginally significant. In any case both sets of estimations –with and without fixed 
effects—lead us to conclude that the asymmetries between the impact of stock imbalances on 
wealth accumulation of debtor and creditor countries does not originate in the residual balance. 
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Table 5.1. Residual balance regressions with fixed effects 
 
 Basic  
spec. 
 (1) 
Diff. btw. cred. 
& deb. 
 (2) 
Diff. btw. cred. & deb. 
w/non-linearities 
(3) 
Valuation 
effects 
 (4) 
Constant 0.017*** 
(0.003) 
0.017*** 
(0.003) 
0.017*** 
(0.003) 
0.015*** 
(0.003) 
Net foreign assets  (L) -0.007*** 
(0.002) 
-0.007*** 
(0.003) 
-0.010*** 
(0.003) 
- 
Net foreign assets  creditor 
counties (L) - 
-0.002 
(0.005) 
0.002 
(0.005) 
- 
Net foreign assets. CA 
accumulation (L) - - - 
-0.016*** 
(0.004) 
Net foreign assets. Valuation 
effects (L) - - - 
0.002 
(0.003) 
Net foreign assets creditor 
countries. CA accumulation 
(L) 
- - - 
0.002 
(0.005) 
Net foreign assets creditor 
countries. Valuation effects 
(L) 
- - - 
0.001 
(0.005) 
Net foreign assets below -
80% (L)  - - 
0.003 
(0.002) 
- 
Real effective trade weighted 
exchange rate (L) 
0.007** 
(0.003) 
0.007** 
(0.003) 
0.007** 
(0.003) 
0.007*** 
(0.003) 
Financial centre -0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
Relative financial depth -0.022*** 
(0.003) 
-0.022*** 
(0.003) 
-0.021*** 
(0.003) 
-0.021*** 
(0.003) 
Relative TFP (L) 0.007** 
(0.003) 
0.007** 
(0.003) 
0.007** 
(0.003) 
0.008*** 
(0.003) 
Relative TFP * K openness (L) -0.018*** 
(0.004) 
-0.018*** 
(0.004) 
-0.018*** 
(0.004) 
-0.014 
(0.004) 
Relative energy balance (oil 
exporters) 
-0.025* 
(0.014) 
-0.025* 
(0.014) 
-0.025* 
(0.014) 
-0.027* 
(0.014) 
Relative pension ratio (L) -0.096*** 
(0.027) 
-0.095*** 
(0.028) 
-0.094*** 
(0.028) 
-0.115*** 
(0.028) 
Relative output growth 0.001 
(0.012) 
0.001 
(0.012) 
0.001 
(0.012) 
-0.002 
(0.012) 
Relative output gap -0.035** 
(0.016) 
-0.035** 
(0.016) 
-0.037** 
(0.015) 
-0.032** 
(0.015) 
Obs. 1262 1262 1262 1262 
R2 0.7815 0.7813 0.7828 0.7965 
 
See previous tables. 
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Table 5.2. Residual balance regressions without fixed effects 
 Basic 
spec. 
 (1) 
Diff. btw. cred. 
& deb. 
 (2) 
Diff. btw. cred. & deb. 
w/non-linearities 
(3) 
Valuation 
effects 
(4) 
Constant 0.009*** 
(0.001) 
0.010*** 
(0.002) 
0.009*** 
(0.002) 
0.009*** 
(0.002) 
Net foreign assets  (L) -0.011*** 
(0.002) 
-0.009*** 
(0.003) 
-0.012*** 
(0.003) 
- 
Net foreign assets  creditor 
counties (L) - 
-0.008* 
(0.005) 
-0.004 
(0.005) 
- 
Net foreign assets below -80% (L)  - - 
0.003 
(0.002) 
- 
Net foreign assets. CA 
accumulation (L) - - - 
-0.020*** 
(0.004) 
Net foreign assets. Valuation 
effects (L) - - - 
0.002 
(0.003) 
Net foreign assets creditor 
countries. CA accumulation (L) - - - 
-0.004 
(0.005) 
Net foreign assets creditor 
countries. Valuation effects (L) - - - 
-0.001 
(0.005) 
Real effective trade weighted 
exchange rate (L) 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
-0.002 
(0.003) 
-0.002 
(0.003) 
0.001 
(0.003) 
Financial centre -0.011*** 
(0.003) 
-0.010*** 
(0.002) 
-0.009*** 
(0.002) 
-0.009*** 
(0.002) 
Relative financial depth -0.013*** 
(0.002) 
-0.012*** 
(0.002) 
-0.012*** 
(0.002) 
-0.012*** 
(0.002) 
Relative TFP (L) 0.011*** 
(0.003) 
0.011*** 
(0.003) 
0.010*** 
(0.003) 
0.009*** 
(0.003) 
Relative TFP * K openness (L) -0.024*** 
(0.004) 
-0.023*** 
(0.004) 
-0.023*** 
(0.004) 
-0.020*** 
(0.004) 
Relative energy balance (oil 
exporters) 
-0.046*** 
(0.014) 
-0.047*** 
(0.014) 
-0.047*** 
(0.014) 
-0.043*** 
(0.013) 
Relative pension ratio (L) -0.091*** 
(0.019) 
-0.090*** 
(0.019) 
-0.088*** 
(0.019) 
-0.095*** 
(0.019) 
Relative output growth -0.007 
(0.012) 
-0.006 
(0.012) 
-0.006 
(0.012) 
-0.010 
(0.012) 
Relative output gap -0.031* 
(0.017) 
-0.032* 
(0.017) 
-0.034** 
(0.017) 
-0.025 
(0.016) 
Obs. 1262 1262 1262 1262 
R2 0.3878 0.3884 0.3930 0.4599 
See previous tables. 
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Appendix 6. Detailed advanced and emerging markets regressions  
  
Table 6.1.a. Current account regressions with fixed effects. Advanced economies 
 Basic 
 specif. 
(1) 
Diff. btw. creditors  
& debtors 
(2) 
Temporary shocks  
w/o non-linearities 
(3) 
Cnte. -0.059*** 
(0.008) 
-0.064*** 
(0.008) 
-0.064*** 
(0.008) 
Net foreign assets (L) 0.004 
(0.006) 
-0.015* 
(0.008) 
-0.013* 
(0.008) 
Net foreign assets  creditor 
counties (L) - 
0.061*** 
(0.014) 
0.063*** 
(0.014) 
Net foreign assets below -80% (L)  - 
0.002 
(0.006) 
- 
Net foreign assets. CA 
accumulation (L) - - - 
Net foreign assets.  
Valuation effects (L) - - - 
Net foreign assets creditor 
countries. CA accumulation (L) - - - 
Net foreign assets creditor 
countries. Valuation effects (L) - - - 
Net foreign assets * output gap (L) - - 
0.110 
(0.202) 
Net foreign assets * negative output 
gap (L) - - 
0.084 
(0.278) 
Net foreign assets creditor 
countries * output gap (L) - - 
-1.080* 
(0.607) 
Net foreign assets creditor 
countries * negative output gap (L) - - 
0.943 
(0.909) 
Real effective trade weighted 
exchange rate (L) 
-0.026*** 
(0.010) 
-0.029*** 
(0.009) 
-0.031*** 
(0.009) 
Nom. eff. FX financial (DL) -0.005 
(0.008) 
-0.001 
(0.008) 
-0.000 
(0.008) 
Financial centre 0.013 
(0.012) 
0.015 
(0.012) 
0.016 
(0.012) 
Relative TFP (L) 0.071*** 
(0.025) 
0.079*** 
(0.024) 
0.078*** 
(0.024) 
Relative TFP * K openness (L) 0.031 
(0.023) 
0.022 
(0.022) 
0.023 
(0.022) 
Relative energy balance 
(oil exporters) 
1.090*** 
(0.178) 
1.118*** 
(0.164) 
1.120*** 
(0.165) 
Relative population growth -0.498 
(0.376) 
-0.465 
(0.370) 
-0.461 
(0.368) 
Relative aging 0.108*** 
(0.040) 
0.124*** 
(0.038) 
0.127*** 
(0.038) 
Health expenditure over GDP (L) -0.087 
(0.167) 
-0.320** 
(0.166) 
-0.357** 
(0.165) 
Relative output growth 0.159** 
(0.062) 
0.179*** 
(0.060) 
0.183*** 
(0.061) 
VIX * capital openness (L) 0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
Relative output gap -0.492*** 
(0.069) 
-0.508*** 
(0.067) 
-0.436*** 
(0.083) 
Commodity ToTgap * trade 
openness 
0.162*** 
(0.051) 
0.152*** 
(0.050) 
0.151*** 
(0.050) 
Relative structural public balance (I) 0.175 
(0.221) 
0.080 
(0.218) 
0.045 
(0.218) 
Relative reserve 
accumulation*capital controls 
0.368*** 
(0.121) 
0.372*** 
(0.121) 
0.372*** 
(0.121) 
Obs. 782 782 782 
R2 0.7389 0.7681 0.7748 
See previous tables. 
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Table 6.2.a. Current account regressions without fixed effects. Advanced economies 
 Basic  
specif. 
(1) 
Diff. btw. creditors  
& debtors 
(2) 
Temporary shocks  
w/o non-linearities 
(3) 
Cnte. -0.010** 
(0.004) 
-0.013*** 
(0.004) 
-0.014*** 
(0.004) 
Net foreign assets (L) 0.013** 
(0.006) 
0.005 
(0.009) 
0.005 
(0.008) 
Net foreign assets  creditor 
counties (L) - 
0.034** 
(0.014) 
0.036*** 
(0.014) 
Net foreign assets below -80% (L)  - 
-0.004 
(0.006) 
- 
Net foreign assets. CA 
accumulation (L) - - - 
Net foreign assets. Valuation 
effects (L) - - - 
Net foreign assets creditor 
countries. CA accumulation (L) - - - 
Net foreign assets creditor 
countries. Valuation effects (L) - - - 
Net foreign assets * output gap (L) - - 
-0.172 
(0.219) 
Net foreign assets * negative 
output gap (L) - - 
0.321 
(0.294) 
Net foreign assets creditor 
countries * output gap (L) - - 
-0.454 
(0.604) 
Net foreign assets creditor 
countries * negative output gap (L) - - 
0.380 
(0.881) 
Real effective trade weighted 
exchange rate (L) 
0.004 
(0.010) 
0.007 
(0.010) 
-0.006 
(0.010) 
Nom. eff. FX financial (DL) -0.012 
(0.008) 
-0.010 
(0.009) 
-0.011 
(0.008) 
Financial centre 0.027*** 
(0.008) 
0.019** 
(0.007) 
0.019** 
(0.008) 
Relative TFP (L) 0.014 
(0.025) 
0.017 
(0.024) 
0.019 
(0.024) 
Relative TFP * K openness (L) -0.001 
(0.028) 
-0.009 
(0.026) 
-0.009 
(0.027) 
Relative energy balance (oil 
exporters) 
0.886*** 
(0.104) 
0.840*** 
(0.097) 
0.851*** 
(0.101) 
Relative population growth -0.259 
(0.344) 
-0.348 
(0.336) 
-0.369 
(0.340) 
Relative aging 0.100*** 
(0.038) 
0.110*** 
(0.034) 
0.111*** 
(0.035) 
Health expenditure over GDP (L) 0.193 
(0.158) 
0.177 
(0.150) 
0.162 
(0.155) 
Relative output growth 0.062 
(0.055) 
0.077 
(0.050) 
0.066 
(0.055) 
VIX * capital openness (L) -0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
Relative output gap -0.378*** 
(0.066) 
-0.391*** 
(0.065) 
-0.366*** 
(0.083) 
Commodity ToTgap * trade 
openness 
0.205*** 
(0.047) 
0.211*** 
(0.048) 
0.206*** 
(0.048) 
Relative structural public balance (I) 0.473*** 
(0.120) 
0.462*** 
(0.109) 
0.472*** 
(0.115) 
Relative reserve 
accumulation*capital controls 
0.362*** 
(0.119) 
0.367*** 
(0.122) 
0.368*** 
(0.121) 
Obs. 782 782 782 
R2 0.5014 0.5322 0.5236 
 
 
 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 59 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1742 
Table 6.1.b. Current account regressions with fixed effects. Emerging markets 
 Basic  
specif. 
(1) 
Diff. btw. creditors  
& debtors 
(2) 
Temporary shocks w/o  
non-linearities 
(3) 
Cnte. 0.004 
(0.014) 
-0.004 
(0.015) 
-0.003 
(0.015) 
Net foreign assets (L) -0.010 
(0.013) 
-0.028* 
(0.015) 
-0.040*** 
(0.015) 
Net foreign assets creditor counties (L) - 
0.024 
(0.071) 
0.006 
(0.094) 
Net foreign assets below -80% (L)  - 
0.020** 
(0.009) 
- 
Net foreign assets. CA accumulation (L) - - - 
Net foreign assets. Valuation effects (L) - - - 
Net foreign assets creditor countries.  
CA accumulation (L) - - - 
Net foreign assets creditor countries. 
Valuation effects (L) - - - 
Net foreign assets * output gap (L) - - 
0.790*** 
(0.220) 
Net foreign assets * negative output gap (L) - - 
-1.197*** 
(0.286) 
Net foreign assets creditor countries * 
output gap (L) - - 
-4.522 
(5.193) 
Net foreign assets creditor countries * 
negative output gap (L) - - 
1.430 
(7.756) 
Real effective trade weighted  
exchange rate (L) 
0.026*** 
(0.009) 
0.027*** 
(0.009) 
0.020** 
(0.009) 
Nom. eff. FX financial (DL) -0.011 
(0.008) 
-0.010 
(0.008) 
-0.014* 
(0.007) 
Financial centre - - - 
Relative TFP (L) 0.050*** 
(0.010) 
0.049*** 
(0.011) 
0.045*** 
(0.011) 
Relative TFP * K openness (L) 0.005 
(0.018) 
-0.001 
(0.018) 
-0.000 
(0.017) 
Relative energy balance (oil exporters) 1.038*** 
(0.400) 
1.122*** 
(0.390) 
1.058*** 
(0.357) 
Relative population growth -0.145 
(0.714) 
-0.198 
(0.712) 
-0.298 
(0.694) 
Relative aging 0.270*** 
(0.103) 
0.273*** 
(0.105) 
0.269*** 
(0.102) 
Health expenditure over GDP (L) -1.255*** 
(0.356) 
-1.296*** 
(0.355) 
-0.993*** 
(0.352) 
Relative output growth -0.200** 
(0.089) 
-0.193** 
(0.088) 
-0.228*** 
(0.085) 
VIX * capital openness (L) 0.001** 
(0.000) 
0.001* 
(0.000) 
0.001* 
(0.000) 
Relative output gap -0.350*** 
(0.101) 
-0.376*** 
(0.100) 
-0.183 
(0.119) 
Commodity ToTgap * trade openness 0.094 
(0.073) 
0.093 
(0.072) 
0.100 
(0.073) 
Relative structural public balance (I) 0.626 
(0.392) 
0.600 
(0.386) 
0.637* 
(0.370) 
Relative reserve accumulation*capital 
controls 
0.281** 
(0.137) 
0.282** 
(0.137) 
0.239* 
(0.136) 
Obs. 382 382 382 
R2 0.5379 0.5402 0.5730 
See previous tables. 
 
 
 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 60 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1742 
Table 6.2.b. Current account regressions without fixed effects. Emerging markets 
 Basic  
specif. 
(1) 
Diff. btw. creditors  
& debtors 
(2) 
Temporary shocks w/o  
non-linearities 
(3) 
Cnte. -0.007 
(0.007) 
-0.015** 
(0.008) 
-0.020** 
(0.008) 
Net foreign assets (L) 0.010 
(0.012) 
-0.013 
(0.014) 
-0.025* 
(0.014) 
Net foreign assets creditor 
counties (L) - 
0.207*** 
(0.068) 
0.226** 
(0.090) 
Net foreign assets below -80% (L)  - 
0.018** 
(0.009) 
- 
Net foreign assets. CA accumulation (L) - - - 
Net foreign assets. Valuation effects (L) - - - 
Net foreign assets creditor countries. 
CA accumulation (L) - - - 
Net foreign assets creditor countries. 
Valuation effects (L) - - - 
Net foreign assets * output gap (L) - - 
0.842*** 
(0.228) 
Net foreign assets * negative output 
gap (L) - - 
-1.274*** 
(0.285) 
Net foreign assets creditor countries * 
output gap (L) - - 
-4.149 
(5.004) 
Net foreign assets creditor countries * 
negative output gap (L) - - 
1.581 
(7.727) 
Real effective trade weighted exchange 
rate (L) 
0.017* 
(0.009) 
0.017* 
(0.009) 
0.012 
(0.009) 
Nom. eff. FX financial (DL) -0.008 
(0.007) 
-0.008 
(0.007) 
-0.010 
(0.007) 
Financial centre - - - 
Relative TFP (L) 0.017** 
(0.008) 
0.010 
(0.008) 
0.004 
(0.008) 
Relative TFP * K openness (L) 0.031*** 
(0.011) 
0.032*** 
(0.011) 
0.030*** 
(0.010) 
Relative energy balance (oil exporters) 0.704** 
(0.322) 
0.672*** 
(0.320) 
0.651** 
(0.289) 
Relative population growth 0.612 
(0.436) 
0.659 
(0.435) 
0.364 
(0.463) 
Relative aging 0.173* 
(0.090) 
0.161* 
(0.091) 
0.108 
(0.088) 
Health expenditure over GDP (L) -1.194*** 
(0.275) 
-1.001*** 
(0.285) 
-0.870*** 
(0.272) 
Relative output growth -0.033 
(0.060) 
-0.035 
(0.060) 
-0.153* 
(0.008) 
VIX * capital openness (L) 0.001* 
(0.000) 
0.001 
(0.000) 
0.001 
(0.000) 
Relative output gap -0.500*** 
(0.075) 
-0.515*** 
(0.074) 
-0.232* 
(0.124) 
Commodity ToTgap * trade openness 0.081 
(0.070) 
0.100 
(0.067) 
0.095 
(0.071) 
Relative structural public balance (I) -0.164 
(0.162) 
-0.196 
(0.165) 
0.291 
(0.363) 
Relative reserve accumulation*capital 
controls 
0.317** 
(0.134) 
0.281** 
(0.132) 
0.231* 
(0.131) 
Obs. 382 382 382 
R2 0.3633 0.3804 0.4437 
See previous tables. 
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Table 6.3.a. Investment income balance regressions with fixed effects.  
Advanced economies 
 Basic  
spec. 
(1) 
Diff. btw. cred.  
& deb. 
(2) 
Diff. btw. cred. & deb. 
w/non-linearities 
(3) 
Cnte. -0.010** 
(0.004) 
-0.010** 
(0.004) 
-0.010** 
(0.005) 
Net foreign assets (L) 0.021*** 
(0.004) 
0.022*** 
(0.005) 
0.022*** 
(0.006) 
Net foreign assets creditor counties (L) - 
-0.004 
(0.010) 
-0.003 
(0.011) 
Net foreign assets below -80% (L)  - - 
0.001 
(0.003) 
Weight of equity instr. in ext. assets (L) 0.033*** 
(0.010) 
0.034*** 
(0.011) 
0.034*** 
(0.011) 
Nom. eff. FX financial weights asset side (LD) 0.004 
(0.008) 
0.003 
(0.008) 
0.003 
(0.008) 
Nom. eff. FX financial weights liabilities side (LD) -0.005 
(0.012) 
-0.004 
(0.012) 
-0.004 
(0.012) 
Relative financial depth 0.003 
(0.006) 
0.003 
(0.006) 
0.003 
(0.006) 
Relative TFP (L) -0.041*** 
(0.014) 
-0.042*** 
(0.014) 
-0.042*** 
(0.014) 
Relative TFP * K openness (L) 0.041*** 
(0.014) 
0.041*** 
(0.014) 
0.041*** 
(0.014) 
Relative population growth -0.066 
(0.218) 
-0.068 
(0.218) 
-0.068 
(0.218) 
VIX * capital openness (L) 0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
Own currency weight in world reserves -0.011 
(0.013) 
-0.011 
(0.013) 
-0.010 
(0.013) 
VIX * own currency weight in world reserves (L) 0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
Relative output gap -0.051 
(0.035) 
-0.052 
(0.035) 
-0.051 
(0.035) 
Relative credit to GDP ratio (I) -0.002 
(0.007) 
-0.002 
(0.007) 
-0.002 
(0.007) 
Relative output growth -0.019 
(0.028) 
-0.019 
(0.028) 
-0.019 
(0.028) 
Obs. 782 782 782 
R2 0.8615 0.8616 0.8617 
See previous tables. 
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Table 6.4.a. Investment income balance regressions without fixed effects.  
Advanced economies 
 Basic  
spec. 
(1) 
Diff. btw. cred.  
& deb. 
(2) 
Diff. btw. cred. & deb. 
w/non-linearities 
(3) 
Cnte. -0.021*** 
(0.004) 
-0.021*** 
(0.004) 
-0.020*** 
(0.004) 
Net foreign assets (L) 0.035*** 
(0.005) 
0.038*** 
(0.006) 
0.042*** 
(0.007) 
Net foreign assets creditor counties (L) - 
-0.005 
(0.012) 
-0.009 
(0.013) 
Net foreign assets below -80% (L)  - - 
-0.004 
(0.004) 
Weight of equity instr. in ext. assets (L) 0.018** 
(0.008) 
0.018** 
(0.007) 
0.019** 
(0.007) 
Nom. eff. FX financial weights asset side (LD) -0.007 
(0.009) 
-0.009 
(0.009) 
-0.007 
(0.009) 
Nom. eff. FX financial weights liabilities side (LD) 0.006 
(0.013) 
0.009 
(0.014) 
0.008 
(0.014) 
Relative financial depth 0.014*** 
(0.004) 
0.015*** 
(0.004) 
0.015*** 
(0.004) 
Relative TFP (L) -0.027* 
(0.016) 
-0.030* 
(0.015) 
-0.031** 
(0.015) 
Relative TFP * K openness (L) 0.050*** 
(0.018) 
0.053*** 
(0.018) 
0.053*** 
(0.018) 
Relative population growth -0.577** 
(0.236) 
-0.623*** 
(0.236) 
-0.607** 
(0.238) 
VIX * capital openness (L) 0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
Own currency weight in world reserves -0.005 
(0.011) 
-0.006 
(0.010) 
-0.006 
(0.010) 
VIX * own currency weight in world reserves (L) -0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
Relative output gap -0.065 
(0.046) 
-0.064 
(0.047) 
-0.066 
(0.047) 
Relative credit to GDP ratio (I) -0.007 
(0.006) 
-0.008 
(0.006) 
-0.009 
(0.006) 
Relative output growth -0.018 
(0.034) 
-0.021 
(0.035) 
-0.020 
(0.035) 
Obs. 782 782 782 
R2 0.4685 0.4752 0.4765 
See previous tables. 
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Table 6.3.b. Investment income balance regressions with fixed effects.  
Emerging economies 
 Basic  
spec. 
(1) 
Diff. btw. cred.  
& deb. 
(2) 
Diff. btw. cred. & deb. 
w/non-linearities 
(3) 
Cnte. -0.015 
(0.010) 
-0.014 
(0.010) 
-0.015 
(0.011) 
Net foreign assets (L) 0.034*** 
(0.006) 
0.034*** 
(0.006) 
0.031*** 
(0.007) 
Net foreign assets creditor counties (L) - 
-0.012 
(0.019) 
-0.008 
(0.020) 
Net foreign assets below -80% (L)  - - 
0.003 
(0.004) 
Weight of equity instr. in ext. assets (L) -0.020** 
(0.008) 
-0.019** 
(0.009) 
-0.019** 
(0.009) 
Nom. eff. FX financial weights asset side (LD) -0.004 
(0.006) 
-0.004 
(0.006) 
-0.005 
(0.006) 
Nom. eff. FX financial weights liabilities side (LD) 0.012 
(0.009) 
0.012 
(0.009) 
0.013 
(0.009) 
Relative financial depth -0.004 
(0.019) 
-0.004 
(0.019) 
-0.003 
(0.019) 
Relative TFP (L) -0.006* 
(0.004) 
-0.006 
(0.004) 
-0.006 
(0.004) 
Relative TFP * K openness (L) -0.010 
(0.007) 
-0.011 
(0.007) 
-0.011 
(0.007) 
Relative population growth -0.264 
(0.274) 
-0.253 
(0.275) 
-0.264 
(0.275) 
VIX * capital openness (L) 0.000* 
(0.000) 
0.000* 
(0.000) 
0.000* 
(0.000) 
Own currency weight in world reserves -0.008 
(0.021) 
-0.008 
(0.021) 
-0.010 
(0.022) 
VIX * own currency weight in world reserves (L) -0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
Relative output gap -0.015 
(0.027) 
-0.016 
(0.027) 
-0.018 
(0.027) 
Relative credit to GDP ratio (I) -0.012* 
(0.007) 
-0.011* 
(0.008) 
-0.011 
(0.008) 
Relative output growth -0.006 
(0.023) 
-0.005 
(0.023) 
-0.005 
(0.023) 
Obs. 382 382 382 
R2 0.6879 0.6881 0.6879 
See previous tables. 
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Table 6.4.b. Investment income balance regressions without fixed effects.  
Emerging economies 
 Basic  
spec. 
(1) 
Diff. btw. cred.  
& deb. 
(2) 
Diff. btw. cred. & deb. 
w/non-linearities 
(3) 
Cnte. -0.027*** 
(0.005) 
-0.029*** 
(0.006) 
-0.028*** 
(0.006) 
Net foreign assets (L) 0.043*** 
(0.006) 
0.042*** 
(0.006) 
0.043*** 
(0.007) 
Net foreign assets creditor counties (L) - 
0.033 
(0.024) 
0.031 
(0.025) 
Net foreign assets below -80% (L)  - - 
-0.001* 
(0.004) 
Weight of equity instr. in ext. assets (L) -0.032*** 
(0.010) 
-0.032*** 
(0.010) 
-0.032*** 
(0.010) 
Nom. eff. FX financial weights asset side (LD) -0.007 
(0.006) 
-0.007 
(0.006) 
-0.007 
(0.006) 
Nom. eff. FX financial weights liabilities side (LD) 0.015* 
(0.009) 
0.015* 
(0.009) 
0.015* 
(0.009) 
Relative financial depth -0.024* 
(0.013) 
-0.023* 
(0.013) 
-0.023 
(0.013) 
Relative TFP (L) -0.010*** 
(0.003) 
-0.011*** 
(0.004) 
-0.011*** 
(0.004) 
Relative TFP * K openness (L) 0.014** 
(0.005) 
0.014*** 
(0.005) 
0.014*** 
(0.005) 
Relative population growth -0.009 
(0.187) 
-0.002 
(0.187) 
0.001 
(0.186) 
VIX * capital openness (L) 0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
Own currency weight in world reserves -0.002 
(0.022) 
-0.002 
(0.022) 
-0.001 
(0.023) 
VIX * own currency weight in world reserves (L) -0.002 
(0.003) 
-0.002 
(0.003) 
-0.002 
(0.003) 
Relative output gap -0.040 
(0.030) 
-0.039 
(0.030) 
-0.038 
(0.030) 
Relative credit to GDP ratio (I) -0.009** 
(0.004) 
-0.012** 
(0.005) 
-0.012** 
(0.005) 
Relative output growth 0.023 
(0.024) 
0.021 
(0.024) 
0.021 
(0.024) 
Obs. 382 382 382 
R2 0.5197 0.5194 0.5113 
See previous tables. 
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Table 6.5.a. Trade balance regressions with fixed effects. 
Advanced economies. 
 Basic  
specif. 
(1) 
Diff. btw. creditors  
& debtors 
(2) 
Temporary shocks  
w/o non-linearities 
(3) 
Cnte. -0.073*** 
(0.008) 
-0.075*** 
(0.008) 
-0.072*** 
(0.009) 
Net foreign assets (L) -0.016*** 
(0.006) 
-0.037*** 
(0.010) 
-0.034*** 
(0.008) 
Net foreign assets 
creditor counties (L) - 
0.062*** 
(0.016) 
0.060*** 
(0.015) 
Net foreign assets 
below -80% (L)  - 
0.005 
(0.005) 
- 
Net foreign assets. CA 
accumulation (L) - - - 
Net foreign assets. 
Valuation effects (L) - - - 
Net foreign assets 
creditor countries. CA 
accumulation (L) 
- - - 
Net foreign assets 
creditor countries. 
Valuation effects (L) 
- - - 
Net foreign assets * 
output gap (L) - - 
0.318 
(0.266) 
Net foreign assets * 
negative output gap (L) - - 
-0.424 
(0.417) 
Net foreign assets 
creditor countries * 
output gap (L) 
- - 
-0.412 
(0.495) 
Net foreign assets 
creditor countries * 
negative output gap (L) 
- - 
0.761 
(0.716) 
Real effective trade 
weighted exchange 
rate (L) 
-0.020** 
(0.009) 
-0.020** 
(0.009) 
-0.026*** 
(0.009) 
Relative TFP (L) 0.154*** 
(0.026) 
0.156*** 
(0.025) 
0.148 
(0.028) 
Relative TFP * K 
openness (L) 
-0.020 
(0.023) 
-0.025 
(0.022) 
-0.025 
(0.024) 
Relative energy 
balance (oil exporters) 
0.924*** 
(0.148) 
0.940*** 
(0.152) 
0.998*** 
(0.148) 
Relative dependency 
ratio 
-0.066 
(0.056) 
0.098* 
(0.054) 
-0.088 
(0.055) 
Relative population 
growth 
-0.514 
(0.399) 
-0.484 
(0.398) 
-0.225 
(0.398) 
Relative aging 0.096* 
(0.057) 
0.099* 
(0.055) 
0.110** 
(0.055) 
Health expenditure 
over GDP (L) 
-0.270 
(0.190) 
-0.428** 
(0.188) 
-0.335* 
(0.181) 
Relative output growth 0.076 
(0.071) 
0.084 
(0.071) 
0.084 
(0.071) 
Relative output gap -0.315*** 
(0.085) 
-0.319*** 
(0.084) 
-0.321*** 
(0.087) 
Commodity ToTgap * 
trade openness 
0.242*** 
(0.045) 
0.234*** 
(0.045) 
0.219*** 
(0.045) 
Relative structural 
public balance (I) 
0.427* 
(0.252) 
0.372 
(0.249) 
0.312 
(0.245) 
Obs. 840 840 816 
R2 0.7742 0.7913 0.8059 
See previous tables. 
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Table 6.6.a. Trade balance regressions without fixed effects.  
Advanced economies. 
 Basic  
specif. 
(1) 
Diff. btw. creditors  
& debtors 
(2) 
Temporary shocks  
w/o non-linearities 
(3) 
Cnte. -0.011* 
(0.006) 
-0.016*** 
(0.006) 
-0.012** 
(0.006) 
Net foreign assets  (L) -0.013** 
(0.006) 
-0.032*** 
(0.011) 
-0.028*** 
(0.009) 
Net foreign assets  
creditor counties (L) - 
0.052*** 
(0.017) 
0.048*** 
(0.015) 
Net foreign assets 
below -80% (L)  - 
0.005 
(0.006) 
- 
Net foreign assets. CA 
accumulation (L) - - - 
Net foreign assets. 
Valuation effects (L) - - - 
Net foreign assets 
creditor countries. CA 
accumulation (L) 
- - - 
Net foreign assets 
creditor countries. 
Valuation effects (L) 
- - - 
Net foreign assets * 
output gap (L) - - 
0.285 
(0.298) 
Net foreign assets * 
negative output gap (L) - - 
-0.377 
(0.464) 
Net foreign assets 
creditor countries * 
output gap (L) 
- - 
-0.240 
(0.515) 
Net foreign assets 
creditor countries * 
negative output gap (L) 
- - 
0.564 
(0.724) 
Real effective trade 
weighted exchange 
rate (L) 
-0.003 
(0.010) 
0.002 
(0.010) 
-0.005 
(0.010) 
Relative TFP (L) 0.095*** 
(0.026) 
0.096*** 
(0.025) 
0.085*** 
(0.027) 
Relative TFP * K 
openness (L) 
-0.064** 
(0.029) 
-0.073*** 
(0.028) 
-0.066** 
(0.029) 
Relative energy 
balance (oil exporters) 
1.044*** 
(0.106) 
1.009*** 
(0.105) 
0.986*** 
(0.106) 
Relative dependency 
ratio 
0.007 
(0.060) 
-0.015 
(0.059) 
-0.026 
(0.061) 
Relative population 
growth 
-0.542 
(0.367) 
-0.562 
(0.366) 
-0.411 
(0.376) 
Relative aging 0.011 
(0.055) 
0.025 
(0.053) 
0.026 
(0.053) 
Health expenditure 
over GDP (L) 
0.175 
(0.200) 
0.237 
(0.197) 
0.326* 
(0.197) 
Relative output growth -0.085 
(0.060) 
-0.077 
(0.059) 
-0.079 
(0.062) 
Relative output gap -0.116 
(0.077) 
-0.117 
(0.077) 
-0.138* 
(0.082) 
Commodity ToTgap * 
trade openness 
0.235*** 
(0.042) 
0.237*** 
(0.043) 
0.233*** 
(0.042) 
Relative structural 
public balance (I) 
1.005*** 
(0.142) 
0.956*** 
(0.137) 
0.908*** 
(0.140) 
Obs. 840 840 816 
R2 0.3656 0.3914 0.3904 
See previous tables. 
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Table 6.5.b. Trade balance regressions with fixed effects.  
Emerging markets. 
 Basic  
specif. 
(1) 
Diff. btw. creditors  
& debtors 
(2) 
Temporary shocks  
w/o non-linearities 
(3) 
Cnte. -0.006 
(0.022) 
-0.016 
(0.022) 
-0.002 
(0.020) 
Net foreign assets (L) -0.032*** 
(0.012) 
-0.053*** 
(0.015) 
-0.056*** 
(0.014) 
Net foreign assets  
creditor counties (L) - 
0.158*** 
(0.059) 
0.108 
(0.071) 
Net foreign assets 
below -80% (L)  - 
0.012 
(0.008) 
- 
Net foreign assets. CA 
accumulation (L) - - - 
Net foreign assets. 
Valuation effects (L) - - - 
Net foreign assets 
creditor countries. CA 
accumulation (L) 
- - - 
Net foreign assets 
creditor countries. 
Valuation effects (L) 
- - - 
Net foreign assets * 
output gap (L) - - 
1.128*** 
(0.264) 
Net foreign assets * 
negative output gap (L) - - 
-1.496*** 
(0.387) 
Net foreign assets 
creditor countries * 
output gap (L) 
- - 
1.807 
(3.376) 
Net foreign assets 
creditor countries * 
negative output gap (L) 
- - 
-3.586 
(4.239) 
Real effective trade 
weighted exchange 
rate (L) 
0.004 
(0.008) 
0.009 
(0.008) 
0.021*** 
(0.008) 
Relative TFP (L) 0.013 
(0.008) 
0.006 
(0.009) 
0.012 
(0.009) 
Relative TFP * K 
openness (L) 
0.007 
(0.015) 
0.005 
(0.015) 
0.006 
(0.014) 
Relative energy 
balance (oil exporters) 
1.183*** 
(0.227) 
1.199*** 
(0.221) 
1.234*** 
(0.256) 
Relative dependency 
ratio 
0.123 
(0.174) 
0.117 
(0.172) 
0.163 
(0.158) 
Relative population 
growth 
-0.555 
(0.359) 
-0.541 
(0.350) 
-0.435 
(0.320) 
Relative aging 0.319*** 
(0.092) 
0.301*** 
(0.091) 
0.222** 
(0.088) 
Health expenditure 
over GDP (L) 
-0.874*** 
(0.315) 
-0.878*** 
(0.313) 
-0.981*** 
(0.299) 
Relative output growth -0.204*** 
(0.074) 
-0.192*** 
(0.073) 
-0.258*** 
(0.072) 
Relative output gap -0.264*** 
(0.083) 
-0.278*** 
(0.082) 
-0.117 
(0.084) 
Commodity ToTgap * 
trade openness 
0.146* 
(0.075) 
0.160** 
(0.075) 
0.139* 
(0.074) 
Relative structural 
public balance (I) 
0.457 
(0.310) 
0.378 
(0.303) 
0.713** 
(0.0285) 
Obs. 421 421 412 
R2 0.6321 0.6416 0.7089 
See previous tables. 
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Table 6.6.b. Trade balance regressions without fixed effects.  
Emerging markets. 
 Basic  
specif. 
(1) 
Diff. btw. creditors  
& debtors 
(2) 
Temporary shocks  
w/o non-linearities 
(3) 
Cnte. -0.015* 
(0.008) 
-0.020** 
(0.008) 
-0.013* 
(0.008) 
Net foreign assets (L) -0.025** 
(0.012) 
-0.048 
(0.014) 
-0.056*** 
(0.014) 
Net foreign assets  
creditor counties (L) - 
0.197*** 
(0.067) 
0.236*** 
(0.078) 
Net foreign assets 
below -80% (L)  - 
0.010 
(0.008) 
- 
Net foreign assets. CA 
accumulation (L) - - - 
Net foreign assets. 
Valuation effects (L) - - - 
Net foreign assets 
creditor countries. CA 
accumulation (L) 
- - - 
Net foreign assets 
creditor countries. 
Valuation effects (L) 
- - - 
Net foreign assets * 
output gap (L) - - 
1.231*** 
(0.284) 
Net foreign assets * 
negative output gap (L) - - 
-1.610*** 
(0.405) 
Net foreign assets 
creditor countries * 
output gap (L) 
- - 
-0.229 
(3.539) 
Net foreign assets 
creditor countries * 
negative output gap (L) 
- - 
0.432 
(4.449) 
Real effective trade 
weighted exchange 
rate (L) 
0.015* 
(0.008) 
0.021*** 
(0.078) 
0.030*** 
(0.008) 
Relative TFP (L) 0.003 
(0.008) 
0.000 
(0.008) 
0.003 
(0.008) 
Relative TFP * K 
openness (L) 
0.037*** 
(0.012) 
0.036*** 
(0.011) 
0.032*** 
(0.011) 
Relative energy 
balance (oil exporters) 
0.865*** 
(0.201) 
0.795*** 
(0.198) 
0.716** 
(0.228) 
Relative dependency 
ratio 
-0.309*** 
(0.085) 
-0.322*** 
(0.082) 
-0.285*** 
(0.077) 
Relative population 
growth 
-0.205 
(0.322) 
-0.161 
(0.318) 
0.085 
(0.312) 
Relative aging 0.090 
(0.097) 
0.078 
(0.092) 
0.050 
(0.085) 
Health expenditure 
over GDP (L) 
-0.058 
(0.281) 
0.040 
(0.275) 
-0.076 
(0.265) 
Relative output growth -0.161*** 
(0.058) 
-0.162*** 
(0.057) 
-0.171*** 
(0.057) 
Relative output gap -0.258*** 
(0.069) 
-0.261*** 
(0.067) 
-0.160** 
(0.073) 
Commodity ToTgap * 
trade openness 
0.158** 
(0.073) 
0.175*** 
(0.075) 
0.158** 
(0.074) 
Relative structural 
public balance (I) 
0.354* 
(0.197) 
0.321* 
(0.189) 
0.351* 
(0.179) 
Obs. 421 421 412 
R2 0.3167 0.3675 0.4489 
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Appendix 7. Real Exchange Rate regressions 
 
Table 7.1. Real Effective Exchange Rate regressions, fixed effects. 
 Basic spec. Diff. btw cred.  
& deb. 
1999- Euro Zone 
break 
Euro Zone member 
dummy 
Cons. -1.551*** 
(0.153) 
-1.527*** 
(0.156) 
-1.432*** 
(0.159) 
-1.591*** 
(0.155) 
Net foreign assets (L) -0.161*** 
(0.029) 
-0.176*** 
(0.038) 
-0.061  
(0.071) 
-0.312*** 
(0.0436) 
Net foreign assets creditor 
countries (L) - 
0.055 
(0.071) 
-0.194 
(0.136) 
0.172** 
(0.084) 
NFA*postEZdummy (L) - - 
-0.214*** 
(0.061) 
- 
NFA creditors * 
postEZdummy (L) - - 
0.304***  
(0.084) 
- 
NFA 99EuroMember * 
postEZdummy (L) - - 
0.222*** 
(0.061) 
- 
NFA 99EuroMember creditor 
* postEZdummy (L) - - 
-0.061 
(0.116) 
- 
NFA *EuroMember (L) - - - 
0.231*** 
(0.048) 
NFA creditors* EuroMember 
(L) - - - 
-0.123 
(0.114) 
Relative GDP at PPP (L)  0.459** 
(0.181) 
0.475** 
(0.187) 
0.269 
(0.203) 
0.520*** 
(0.185) 
VIX * capital openness (L) -0.0008  
(0.001) 
-0.0008  
(0.001) 
-0.001* 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
VIX* capital openness*own 
country share in world 
reserves (L) 
0.001  
(0.004) 
0.001  
(0.004) 
0.005 
(0.004) 
-0.000 
(0.003) 
Own country share in world 
reserves 
0.261***  
(0.063) 
0.241***  
(0.070) 
0.261*** 
(0.079) 
0.466*** 
(0.084) 
Relative trade openness (L) -0.278  
(0.183) 
-0.281  
(0.182) 
-0.350** 
(0.163) 
-0.306* 
(0.176) 
Rel. expected growth 3.754*** 
(0.949) 
3.775*** 
(0.947) 
3.584*** 
(0.853) 
3.418*** 
(0.896) 
Relative population growth 3.929*** 
(1.486) 
3.962*** 
(1.485) 
3.914** 
(1.535) 
3.023** 
(1.336) 
Relative aging -0.548*  
(0.313) 
-0.509 
(0.318) 
-0.340 
(0.285) 
-0.467 
(0.296) 
Relative dependency ratio -0.893** 
(0.383) 
-0.859** 
(0.398) 
-0.865** 
(0.377) 
-0.955** 
(0.380) 
Rel. institutional risk 0.278*** 
(0.056) 
0.274*** 
(0.057) 
0.216*** 
(0.055) 
0.243*** 
(0.058) 
Rel. K stock per employee 0.537*** 
(0.162) 
0.506*** 
(0.179) 
0.650*** 
(0.189) 
-0.312*** 
(0.043) 
Rel. VAT as % of GDP 0.002 
(0.011) 
0.002 
(0.011) 
-0.000 
(0.011) 
0.004 
(0.011) 
Commodity TOT 0.652*** 
(0.067) 
0.638*** 
(0.070) 
0.615*** 
(0.072) 
0.669*** 
(0.070) 
Share of administered prices -0.221 
(0.841) 
-0.197 
(0.840) 
-0.315 
(0.635) 
-0.048 
(0.803) 
Rel. Gini index 0.112 
(0.394) 
0.097 
(0.400) 
0.076 
(0.403) 
0.053 
(0.388) 
Rel. pensions (L) 1.452*** 
(0.414) 
1.421*** 
(0.423) 
1.461*** 
(0.446) 
1.492*** 
(0.418) 
 
Rel. output gap (I) 
 
0.658 
(0.405) 
0.654 
(0.407) 
0.655* 
(0.381) 
0.559 
(0.411) 
Obs. 977 977 977 977 
R2 0.9396 0.9397 0.9446 0.9427 
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Table 7.2. Real Effective Exchange Rate regressions without fixed effects. 
 Basic spec. Diff. btw cred.  
& deb. 
1999- Euro Zone 
break 
Euro Zone member 
dummy 
Cons. -0.825*** 
(0.224) 
-0.927*** 
(0.217) 
-0.901*** 
(0.215) 
-0.928*** 
(0.215) 
Net foreign assets (L) 0.108*** 
(0.029) 
-0.065** 
(0.032) 
0.113 
(0.076) 
0.028 
(0.045) 
Net foreign assets creditor 
countries (L) - 
0.414*** 
(0.056) 
0.407*** 
(0.107) 
0.323*** 
(0.069) 
NFA*postEZdummy (L) - - 
-0.176** 
(0.076) 
- 
NFA creditors * 
postEZdummy (L) - - 
-0.006 
(0.097) 
- 
NFA 99EuroMember * 
postEZdummy (L) - - 
-0.016 
(0.046) 
- 
NFA 99EuroMember creditor 
* postEZdummy (L) - - 
-0.285*** 
(0.094) 
- 
NFA *EuroMember (L) - - - 
-0.161*** 
(0.047) 
NFA creditors*  
EuroMember (L) - - - 
-0.123 
(0.099) 
Relative GDP at PPP (L)  0.11*** 
(0.022) 
0.136*** 
(0.021) 
0.136*** 
(0.020) 
0.143*** 
(0.020) 
VIX * capital openness (L) 0.0003 
(0.002) 
0.0001 
(0.002) 
-0.0006 
(0.002) 
0.0003 
(0.002) 
VIX* capital openness*own 
country share in world 
reserves (L) 
0.0006 
(0.008) 
0.0017 
(0.007) 
0.004 
(0.007) 
0.001 
(0.006) 
Own country share in world 
reserves 
0.11 
(0.081) 
0.119 
(0.077) 
0.134 
(0.082) 
0.056 
(0.076) 
Relative trade openness (L) -0.006 
(0.076) 
-0.039 
(0.074) 
0.016 
(0.080) 
0.015 
(0.080) 
Rel. expected growth 5.39*** 
(1.193) 
5.817*** 
(0.112) 
5.884*** 
(1.141) 
5.664*** 
(1.140) 
Relative population growth 9.66*** 
(1.45) 
9.807*** 
(1.415) 
10.723*** 
(1.446) 
9.949*** 
(1.410) 
Relative aging 0.332 
(0.256) 
0.498** 
(0.245) 
0.477** 
(0.240) 
0.428* 
(0.246) 
Relative dependency ratio 0.436* 
(0.249) 
0.42* 
(0.251) 
0.491* 
(0.261) 
0.487* 
(0.261) 
Rel. institutional risk 0.151*** 
(0.031) 
0.136*** 
(0.029) 
0.136*** 
(0.030) 
0.139*** 
(0.029) 
Rel. K stock per employee 0.745*** 
(0.030) 
0.736*** 
(0.069) 
0.705*** 
(0.068) 
0.723*** 
(0.069) 
Rel. VAT as % of GDP 0.027*** 
(0.070) 
0.033*** 
(0.069) 
0.033*** 
(0.006) 
0.034*** 
(0.006) 
Commodity TOT 0.393*** 
(0.110) 
0.415*** 
(0.107) 
0.405*** 
(0.106) 
0.425*** 
(0.107) 
Share of administered prices -2.131*** 
(0.343) 
-2.333*** 
(0.304) 
-2.340*** 
(0.289) 
-2.133*** 
(0.331) 
Rel. Gini index -0.763** 
(0.343) 
-0.899*** 
(0.33) 
-0.864** 
(0.334) 
-0.861*** 
(0.329) 
Rel. pensions (L) 1.297*** 
(0.352) 
1.243*** 
(0.345) 
1.499*** 
(0.369) 
1.269*** 
(0.358) 
 
Rel. output gap (I) 
 
4.716*** 
(0.919) 
4.506*** 
(0.888) 
4.331*** 
(0.887) 
4.610*** 
(0.355) 
Obs. 977 977 977 977 
R2 0.8277 0.8434 0.8496 0.8488 
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